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PROLOGUE 
In 2013, Netflix introduced the world to Frank Underwood, a South Carolina 
Democrat serving as majority whip in the House of Representatives.1  House of 
Cards follows Mr. Underwood on his maniacal journey to seize power, exact 
revenge on political opponents, and climb his way to the pinnacle of political 
offices: President of the United States.2  As the title of the series suggests, 
Underwood pursues these goals by building a house of cards that is ready to 
collapse at the slightest miscalculation or error.  Few political dramas have 
captured the attention of the American public with such force.  It is no surprise, 
then, that central to Underwood’s success of attaining political office is a 
political topic currently captivating American politics: campaign finance.  What 
the viewers of House of Cards might overlook, though, is that the foundation of 
Underwood’s “house of cards” is a political environment that embraces the 
notion that money in politics is a “good” thing.  In fact, the crux of Season Two 
is directly related to the political contributions of wealthy individuals in their 
effort to influence politics.  Thus, to fully grasp the circumstances surrounding 
House of Cards, we must look back to the “house of cards” the U.S. Supreme 
Court built in 2010. 
In a decades-long struggle to balance First Amendment rights and corruption, 
the Supreme Court has slowly eroded congressional attempts to eradicate the 
influence of individuals in the political process.  In Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, 3  the Supreme Court held that corporations could 
contribute an unlimited amount of money to influence elections.4  In an equally 
important, yet tragically underreported case—Keating v. Federal Election 
Commission5—the Supreme Court passively affirmed, by denying cert from a 
lower court’s holding, that Super Political Action Committees (“Super PACs”) 
are constitutional.6  Most recently, the “house” was built higher in McCutcheon 
v. Federal Election Commission,7 in which the Court struck down the aggregate 
limits on direct contributions to political campaigns by individuals. 8   The 
Court—cloaked under the auspices of free speech—has built a seemingly 
indestructible house of cards that cements the ability of wealthy individuals to 
influence elections. 
                                                        
 1. House of Cards, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1856010/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 2. The author apologizes for any spoilers contained in this Article.  If you’ve yet to complete 
Season Two, proceed at your own risk. 
 3. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 372. 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010). 
 6. Id. 
 7. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 8. Id. at 1462. 
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Frank Underwood’s house of cards emanates directly from the “house of 
cards” built by the Supreme Court.  As is the focus of much of Season Two, 
dollars breed results.  While Underwood’s own actions will presumably bring 
his house crashing down, the Supreme Court cannot be left to its own devices.  
In fact, when left alone, the Court has not only reaffirmed its 2010 decision, but 
has extended its reach to personal contributions as well.9  Attack after attack on 
Citizens United has failed, and thus a new argument must be brought to the 
forefront.  This Article meets this objective by looking back to the foundation of 
American democracy in the late-eighteenth century: republicanism. 
INTRODUCTION 
John Adams claimed that “[t]here is not a more unintelligible word in the 
English language than republicanism.”10  With all due respect to Mr. Adams, I 
must disagree.  Republicanism—its definition and constitutional implication—
is clear.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to agree with Adams; the 
Court’s avoidance of republicanism in constitutional interpretation suggests 
either it does not understand the role of republicanism in American 
constitutional theory, or it thinks republicanism is a worthless concept.  Like Mr. 
Adams, the Supreme Court is wrong. 
This Article fully explores and uncovers the historical understanding of 
creating a republican form of government.  It ultimately suggests that the 
underlying constitutional principle of republicanism, weighed against textual 
provisions of the Constitution, should be the analytical tool with which to 
determine the constitutionality of a wide array of federal and state legislation.  
This Article focuses primarily on how the Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment implicates republicanism, particularly when reviewing campaign 
finance legislation.  Lawyers and judges have been taught wrongly to adjudicate 
the First Amendment without a larger understanding of the surrounding text of 
the Constitution.  This Article corrects that error, and suggests campaign finance 
laws are appropriately reviewed only when analyzed with the underlying 
constitutional principle of republicanism created by the ratification of the 
Constitution.11  It fills a critical void in legal scholarship and is particularly 
relevant in light of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in McCutcheon. 12 
 
                                                        
 9. See id. 
 10. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JOHN ADAMS AND MERCY WARREN 432 (Charles F. 
Adams ed., 1972). 
 11. Akhil Amar has called this mode of constitutional interpretation “intratextualism.”  Akhil 
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). 
 12. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462. 
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The U.S. Constitution created a republican form of government.13  At the 
Constitutional Convention, the Framers repeatedly addressed republicanism, 
and ultimately built an entire constitution based on these principles.14  Moreover, 
while the majority of the Constitution only regulates the federal government, the 
Framers made it a point to guarantee this republican structure of government to 
the states in the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.15  The republican form of 
government was so integral to the proper functioning of the nation that the 
Framers also found it necessary to demand that every state provide this form of 
government. 
The difficult questions that follow are: what does a republican form of 
government require?  What features are integral to the successful functioning of 
the nation?  What can subvert the republic, and to what extent must all branches 
protect the republic?  The decade prior to the Revolution of 1776 illuminates the 
growing concern of corruption in government, which radically shaped the 
colonists’ views on appropriate forms of government.  These views were 
expressed and developed at the Constitutional Convention, which provided 
definitive answers to the above questions.16  Moreover, The Federalist and other 
writings of the Framers animate what a republic entails, emphasizing that a 
republic’s survival depends on the ability to avoid corruption in government.17 
Despite the fact that a republican form of government lies at the heart of the 
Constitution, why should it be used in modern constitutional analysis?  No 
textual provision authorizes its use,18 nor has Congress invoked it when passing 
campaign finance legislation.19  While it may be tempting to disregard this mode 
of analysis for its lack of solid textual grounding, a review of the Court’s 
jurisprudence cautions against doing so.  Modern Supreme Court opinions have 
                                                        
 13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (David Wootton ed., 2003).  Madison 
wrote: 
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the 
government be strictly republican?  It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable 
with the genius of the people of America . . . . If the plan of the convention . . . be found 
to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer 
defensible. 
Id. at 226. 
 14. See id. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 16. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373 
(2009). 
 17. See id. at 350. 
 18. Unless, as only one scholar has suggested, the Guarantee Clause is grounds enough to do 
so.  See Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New Approach, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 771‒72 (2003).  This method will be explored and rejected as 
unnecessary later in this Article.  See infra Part V. 
 19. One possible explanation for why Congress does not invoke the Guarantee Clause is 
because it is not found in Article I of the Constitution.  See Alexander, supra note 18, at 801. 
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regularly invoked non-textual principles to determine the constitutionality of a 
given law.20  Similarly, the Court has acted to enforce overarching principles 
found in and emerging from the Constitution, even when no textual reading 
would allow for doing so.21 
One final problem arises: if the text of the Constitution creates a republican 
form of government and if that principle is a legitimate tool for analysis, did the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments alter this 
understanding of republicanism?  Amendments, by nature, alter the original 
Constitution in some form.  However, this understanding of the Bill of Rights is 
overstated.  During the ratification debates, many of the Framers in Philadelphia 
had already accepted the future inclusion of the Bill of Rights, believing the 
essence of the Constitution would not change dramatically.22 
This Article answers these questions in four parts.  Part I explores the creation 
of a republican form of government in the United States.  This Part analyzes the 
pre-revolutionary historiography, the colonists’ fear of corruption in 
government, and numerous founding documents of the Constitution to uncover 
what exactly a republican government entails.  Further, it explores and assesses 
modern republicanism proposals.  Part II examines the recent invocation of 
underlying constitutional principles in Supreme Court opinions and addresses 
how, and to what extent, they have been used to decide cases.  This Part 
highlights the increasing use of underlying constitutional principles by the 
Supreme Court and extracts a formula from recent cases for invoking underlying 
constitutional principles in the future.  Part III examines how and why the 
Court’s existing jurisprudence in the realm of campaign finance is ripe for 
republicanism.  It suggests that the First Amendment has failed to develop in 
useful ways to apply to modern political campaigns.  It reviews the Supreme 
Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo23 and 
culminating in Citizens United, and suggests that the Court can correct its 
erroneous application of the First Amendment by understanding the First 
Amendment in light of republican principles.  Part IV demonstrates how 
republicanism should apply to the First Amendment challenges to campaign 
                                                        
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(using “federalism” and “separation of powers”—non-textual provisions of the Constitution—to 
illuminate the limits of the Commerce Clause). 
 21. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499‒500 (1954) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause captures the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 22. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 23 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 438, 440 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (“Let me add that a bill of 
rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, 
and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.”); Herbert J. Storing, The 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING: TOWARD A MORE 
PERFECT UNION 109 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995) (“[T]he common view that the heart of 
American liberty is to be found in the Bill of Rights is wrong.”). 
 23. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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finance laws and specifically reviews Citizens United and McCutcheon.  
Moreover, it explores claims made by the state of Montana, who argued that 
Citizens United should not apply within its territorial limits, why those claims 
failed, and how other states can raise successful arguments toward the same end 
in the future.  Lastly, the limits of republicanism are explored in this Part by 
examining an Arizona case, Galassini v. Town of Fountain Hills.24  Part V 
establishes this Article’s mode of republicanism as the superior tool for 
constitutional interpretation compared to the Court’s current approach and 
alternative modes of interpretation that have been suggested by other scholars.  
It reviews three recent law review articles to assert this Article’s definition of 
republicanism as the only way to fully capture republicanism’s usefulness.  This 
Article concludes by applying republicanism—in the wake of McCutcheon—to 
future challenges to campaign finance restrictions, and speculates regarding the 
implications of republicanism beyond campaign finance, and how those areas of 
law would, and should, change when considered in light of this Article. 
I.  CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
Legal scholars who have explored American republicanism are tempted to 
direct their attention immediately to the Constitutional Convention, including 
the ratification debates found in The Federalist and elsewhere.25  Succumbing 
to this temptation is excusable, given that James Madison defines republicanism 
in The Federalist Number 39 as “a government which derives all its powers 
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by 
persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good 
behavior.”26  However, the Convention should be viewed as a synthesis of, not 
the invention of, American republicanism.  American republicanism largely 
developed as a response to the realization of the corruption of the British 
Constitution in the 1760s, and exists to prevent the erosion of successful 
government by corruption in the future. 27   To sufficiently understand the 
development of republicanism in America, we must turn our attention to the 
decade prior to the American Revolution. 
                                                        
 24. See Galassini v. Town of Fountain Hills, No. CV-11-02097-PHXJAT, 2011 WL 5244960 
(D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2011). 
 25. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1516‒17 (1988); 
Teachout, supra note 16, at 344. 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 13, at 226 (James Madison). 
 27. See Teachout, supra note 16, at 353‒54. 
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A.  Upswell of Republican Thought in the 1760–70s 
The Framers were largely shaped by their country’s pre-revolutionary 
existence as part of the British Empire.28  If anything was clear at the time of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, it was that monarchy could not be the form 
of government for the fledgling nation.29  Gordon Wood, famed historian of the 
Early Republic, suggests that republicanism was the clear result of the colonists’ 
experiences in the pre-revolution colonies and their understanding of classical 
antiquity.  Wood notes: “[Republicanism] embodied the ideal of the good society 
as it had been set forth from antiquity through the eighteenth century.”30  Before 
republicanism could become the clearly correct choice for society, though, the 
colonists needed to articulate why the British Constitutional system was no 
longer a sufficient system of government under which to live. 
As subjects of the British Empire,31 the colonists assumed they were living 
under the rule of the British Constitution.32  This assumption is largely due to a 
process referred to as Anglicization: the process by which the colonies 
resembled the British Empire by sharing “institutions of politics and government 
on all levels.”33  With Anglicization came the recognition and articulation of 
tangible rights of the colonists, one of which was the right of the subjects to be 
free from Parliament, “tak[ing] from any man any part of his property, without 
his consent in person or by representation.”34  If Parliament and the King were 
acting in accordance with the British Constitution, no violation of the colonists’ 
rights would occur.  By 1763, however, the colonists sensed an impending threat 
to their liberty.  Historian Bernard Bailyn notes that: 
Writings popular in the colonies insisted that the environment of 
eighteenth-century England was, to a dangerous degree, hostile to 
                                                        
 28. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV 413, 468‒69 (2006). 
 29. Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an 
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49, 72 (1972) 
(“Americans believed that republicanism meant an absence of an aristocracy and a monarchy.”). 
 30. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776‒1787 59 (1969). 
 31. The claim that colonists were British subjects may seem controversial, however, this point 
was conceded by James Otis, a lawyer from Massachusetts who wrote during the pre-revolutionary 
era.  See JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 52 (1763). 
 32. See id.; see also Imperial Crisis: The Colonies Under British Rule, http://claver. 
gprep.org/fac/sjochs/imperial-lcrisis.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
 33. ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763–
1789 28 (1982).  Anglicization’s impact on the colonies cannot be overstated.  Historian John 
Murrin’s work is often under-appreciated.  His work illuminates the degree to which the colonies 
resembled Great Britain, and how this development led to the American Revolution.  See John M. 
Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND 
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333, 340 
(Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987). 
 34. OTIS, supra note 31, at 55. 
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liberty: . . . that politics festered in corruption.  Specifically, the 
colonists were told again and again that the prime requisite of 
constitutional liberty, an independent Parliament free from the 
influence of the crown’s prerogative, was being undermined by the 
successful efforts of the administration to manipulate Parliamentary 
elections to its advantage and to impose its will on members in 
Parliament.35 
Why were the colonists so sure of this threat to liberty?  Bailyn suggests it 
was because the colonists were largely shaped by “eighteenth-century history 
and political theory—that ‘what happened yesterday will come to pass again, 
and the same causes will produce like effects in all ages.’”36  What “happened 
yesterday” in the minds of the colonists was the corruption of the British 
Constitution, which mirrored the fall of the Roman Empire because “the old laws 
of Rome became inoperative under corruption.”37   Historian J.G.A. Pocock 
details the colonists’ understanding of the Florentine Renaissance and how that 
knowledge influenced their perception of an impending threat to liberty.38  The 
colonists looked across the ocean and saw corruption eroding the very society 
they had aspired to resemble. 
When critically reexamining their political institutions, their fears had been 
confirmed: the corruption from Britain was slowly creeping into American 
political life as well.  None saw this clearer than John Dickinson, a 
Pennsylvanian lawyer and close follower of the happenings in Britain.39  H. 
Trevor Colbourn, in John Dickinson, Historical Revolutionary, notes that 
“contemporary England was frequently shown racing toward . . . political 
collapse, ridden with corruption, and afflicted with an unrepresentative 
Parliament.”40   Dickinson observed, and other colonists agreed, that with a 
growing fiscal-military state, an escalating national debt, and a Parliament that 
did not defend the British Constitution, the “mother country [was] on the high 
road to ruin, oblivious of her ancestral liberties, and mostly unaware that the way 
to salvation lay in a return to Saxon simplicity, with annually elected and 
uncorrupted parliaments.” 41   Dickinson’s fears were confirmed by his 
                                                        
 35. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 86 
(1967). 
 36. Id. at 85 (quoting JOHN TRENCHARD & WALTER MOYLE, AN ARGUMENT 5 (1697)). 
 37. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT 
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 208 (2003). 
 38. Id. at 506. 
 39. H. Trevor Colbourn, John Dickinson, Historical Revolutionary, 83 PENN MAG. OF HIST. 
& BIOGRAPHY 271, 271 (1959). 
 40. Id. at 283. 
 41. Id.  For an extensive discussion describing the role of the fiscal-military state in Britain, 
see, e.g., The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Honour of P.G.M. 
Dickinson, in 126 THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW 707, 707‒08 (G.W. Bernard & Martin 
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communications with James Burgh and Catherine Macaulay in Great Britain, 
and he wholeheartedly believed “the mother country was now attempting to 
spread her own decadence and corruption to America.”42 
With the passage of the Sugar Act of 1764—a tax unilaterally levied by 
Parliament—the colonists experienced first-hand how the corruption of Britain 
was spreading to the colonies. 43   James Otis, a Bostonian lawyer and 
pamphleteer, wrote Rights of the British Colonies Asserted to highlight the 
corruption of the political process in Britain and to urge Parliament to protect 
the rights of the colonists.44  Otis did not suggest that the Empire had no ability 
to tax the colonists; he did, however, argue that this tax was a deprivation of 
property without any representation from the colonies.  “The very act of taxing, 
exercised over those who are not represented,” Otis claimed, “appears to me to 
be depriving them of one of their most essential rights, as freemen; and if 
continued, seems to be in effect an entire disfranchisement of every civil right.”45  
If the rights of the British subjects were properly protected, taxation without 
representation would not occur.  Parliament’s decision to deprive the colonies 
of property through the Sugar Act was a result of Parliament’s corruption by the 
King and other forces.46   This corruption, which caused the deprivation of 
property,  Otis further lamented, “deprives me of my liberty, and makes me a 
slave.”47 
While the efforts of Otis and other colonial activists successfully encouraged 
Parliament to repeal the Sugar Act, the corrupt Parliament continued to usurp 
the colonists’ rights.  In 1765, Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which deprived 
the colonists of property once again by taxing paper products.48  Daniel Dulany, 
a pamphleteer, objected to the unjust act of Parliament.  The legitimacy of 
Parliament depended on the intimate connection between electors and the 
elected; without such a connection, Parliament had no authority to tax the 
colonies, thus violating the British Constitution.  Dulany asserted that, “[t]here 
                                                        
Conway eds., 2011); JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH 
STATE 1688–1783 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990) (1988). 
 42. Shalhope, supra note 29, at 60. 
 43. See The Sugar Act, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/ 
sugaract.htm, (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
 44. See generally OTIS, supra note 31, at 56‒57. 
 45. Id. at 57‒58. 
 46. The corruption of Parliament can be traced to the reign of Robert Walpole as First Minister 
to the King from 1721 to 1742.  Under his rule, patronage increased, at one point affecting over 
sixty percent of Parliament.  Parliament thus reflected the will of the King, not of the electors of 
the members of Parliament.  This development in eighteenth-century England is referred to as 
“Court Ideology.”  See EDWARD PEARCE, THE GREAT MAN: SIR ROBERT WALPOLE—
SCOUNDREL, GENIUS AND BRITAIN’S FIRST PRIME MINISTER 1‒2 (2007). 
 47. OTIS, supra note 31, at 57. 
 48. The Stamp Act, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/stampact. 
htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
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is not that intimate and inseparable relation between the electors of Great-
Britain, and the Inhabitants of the colonies . . . not a single actual elector in 
England, might be immediately affected by a taxation in America.”49 
The passage of these two acts by Parliament marked the beginning of the shift 
from peaceful existence between the colonies and Great Britain to armed 
revolution.  It became clear to the colonists—many of whom would later become 
Framers of the Constitution—that the corruption of Parliament seriously 
threatened their liberty.  James Wilson identified the quid pro quo relationship 
between the legislator and his appointee as a factor that jeopardized successful 
governance.  Wilson wrote: “[T]he Crown will take advantage of every 
opportunity of extending its prerogative, in opposition to the privileges of the 
people; [and] that it is the interests of those who have pensions or offices . . . 
from the crown, to concur in all its measures.” 50   Benjamin Franklin also 
recognized the corruption of Parliament through the system of patronage, which 
created legislators acting in their own self-interest.  In his letter to Joseph 
Galloway, Franklin wrote, “when I consider the extream [sic] Corruption 
prevalent among all Orders of Men in this old rotten State . . . [the remaining 
part of the British Empire] will only be to corrupt and poison us also.”51  John 
Adams claimed that liberty could not exist where “both electors and elected are 
becoming one mass of corruption.”52   It was clear to the colonists that the 
corruption of Parliament was a result of the elected officials achieving political 
office by the actions of select individuals rather than through the electoral 
process.  This patronage was a principal cause of the revolution, for had 
Parliament not become corrupt, the unjust taxing policies would never have been 
passed. 
B.  Synthesizing Their Experiences: The Constitutional Convention and 
Ratification Debates 
The Constitutional Convention should be viewed as primarily responsible for 
creating a republican form of government.  “Republicanism” is referred to 
throughout the Constitutional Convention in The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787.53  The word “republic” or “republican” appears over 150 
                                                        
 49. DANIEL DULANY, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES IN THE 
BRITISH COLONIES 10 (1765). 
 50. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT (1774). 
 51. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Galloway (Feb. 25, 1775), in 6 THE WRITINGS 
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, at 311–12 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1906). 
 52. 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (Charles 
Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
 53. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 24, 32, 37, 56, 98, 122, 132, 
169, 176, 179, 196, 224, 241, 243, 252, 256, 316, 368 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
RECORDS]. 
2015] House of Cards: Rediscovering Republicanism 659 
times in The Federalist, with Number 39 devoted exclusively to republican 
principles in the Constitution.54  In this publication, James Madison saw no 
alternative to republicanism: 
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and 
aspect of the government be strictly republican.  It is evident that no 
other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of 
America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with 
that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, 
to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-
government.55 
Edmund Randolph, a Virginian delegate to the Constitutional Convention, 
asserted “a republican government must be the basis of our national union.”56 
George Mason, a fellow Virginian representative, saw the most important task 
of the Convention as preventing corruption.  Mason stated,  “if we do not provide 
against corruption, our government will soon be at an end.”57  Other Framers 
shared this sentiment, recognizing that “the government should be founded on 
the authority of the people.”58  Based on these beliefs, the Constitution, places 
supreme authority in the people by creating a representative democracy.  This 
emphasis is consistent with Madison’s definition of a republic in The Federalist 
Number 39: “[W]e may define a republic to be . . . a government, that the persons 
administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people.”59  
Madison distinguished between a democracy and a republic, stating that “in a 
democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic 
they assemble and administer it by their representatives.” 60   Because the 
representatives are elected by the people, the republic is protected against the 
“cabals of a few.”61  The Constitution reflects this principle: all power delegated 
in the Constitution ultimately comes from the people. 
The House of Representatives is directly elected by the people.62  The Senate 
was, at the time, elected by state legislatures, which were elected by the people 
of the states.63  The president is elected by the Electoral College, which is 
                                                        
 54. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 13 (James Madison) (titling this paper 
“The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. RECORDS, supra note 53, at 206. 
 57. Id. at 392. 
 58. WOOD, supra note 30, at 441 (internal quotations omitted). 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 226 (James Madison) (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
 60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 179 (James Madison) (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  The Seventeenth Amendment provides for the direct election 
of senators by the people.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  This Amendment arguably made the 
constitution more republican in that it removed one layer between the people and their 
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indirect representation by the people.64  Lastly, the Supreme Court is appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 65   While structurally the 
Constitution is republican, the core of republicanism lies in the actions of the 
representatives and the legitimacy of the electoral process.  Beyond the general 
structure, numerous provisions in the Constitution embody what Professor 
Zephyr Teachout has called “anti-corruption clauses.”66  Madison asserted that 
the failings of other republics—mainly through corruption and representatives 
serving their own interests—are mitigated by the new republican form of 
government in America: “In the extent and proper structure of the Union, 
therefore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to 
Republican Government.”67 
At the heart of republicanism are elected representatives who sacrifice their 
individual desires for the public good.  Thomas Paine succinctly noted, “the 
word republic means the public good, or the good of the whole, in 
contradistinction to the despotic form, which makes the good of the sovereign, 
or of one man, the only object of the government.”68  This conception of the 
public good was not unique to Paine; rather, it permeated the very fabric of 
American society.  Gordon Wood notes that “[n]o phrase except ‘liberty’ was 
invoked more often by the Revolutionaries than ‘the public good.’”69  To Wood, 
“republicanism obliterated the individual.”70  Benjamin Rush declared: “Every 
man in a republic . . . is public property.  His time and talents—his youth—his 
manhood—his old age—nay more, life, all belong to his country.”71  Without 
this realization of public good by public officials, the early republic risked 
corruption eroding the fabric of the new nation. 
The need to avoid this erosion was clear by the time of the Convention.  James 
Madison observed in his records that the very need for the Convention was “[t]he 
corruption [and] mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States.” 72  
Professor Teachout notes that “[c]orruption was discussed more often in the 
Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or instability.”73  The reason 
                                                        
representatives.  This demonstrates that republican principles were not simply a passing trend, but 
remain a powerful idea today. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1‒3. 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 66. Teachout, supra note 16, at 354.  Professor Teachout has detailed twenty-five provisions 
embodying this principle.  See id. at 355. 
 67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 68. THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON GOVERNMENT, THE AFFAIRS OF THE BANK, AND 
PAPER-MONEY 5 (1786). 
 69. WOOD, supra note 30, at 55. 
 70. Id. at 61. 
 71. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 72. RECORDS, supra note 53, at 288. 
 73. Teachout, supra note 16, at 352. 
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for this prevalence can be traced to the pre-revolutionary experience of the 
colonies and the experiences of early state constitutions.74  The Framers, many 
of whom fought in the revolution, did not need to try hard to remember their 
grievances against Parliament for its corrupt policies and practices.75  Robert 
Shalhope, discerning the republican reality of the Founding Era, claims 
“[r]epublicanism meant maintaining public and private virtue, internal unity, 
social solidarity, and it meant constantly struggling against ‘threats’ to the 
‘republican character’ of the nation.”76 
What did the Framers perceive as threats to republicanism?  The most obvious 
and serious of the threats was corruption, which was most dangerous when it 
perverted the legislature because republicanism is subverted when legislators act 
in accordance with individual desires rather than the public good.  Alexander 
Hamilton described how republicanism is subverted in The Federalist Number 
22: 
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the 
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and 
power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any 
but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to 
exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and 
to overbalance the obligations of duty.  Hence it is that history 
furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of 
foreign corruption in republican governments.77 
While corruption was certainly evident in the British Empire, the Framers 
quickly recognized its appearance in early state lawmaking.  Gordon Wood 
argues that electors were “instructing” their legislators such that, instead of 
pursuing the public good, legislators would follow the instructions of particular 
electors.78  In Maryland, the ability to instruct legislators was debated.79  One 
delegate argued the logical implications of instructing legislators: “If the people 
. . . claim a right to instruct the Senate, as ultimately chosen by them . . . by a 
parity in reasoning, the Governor and Council, Delegates to Congress, and 
Judges of our Courts are liable to be instructed by them.”80  If instruction of 
legislators could occur, the American republic would resemble Parliament 
insofar as legislators would no longer represent the will of the entire populous, 
but rather the specific desires of the few. 
                                                        
 74. See infra notes 75‒83 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra notes 39‒52 and accompanying text. 
 76. Shalhope, supra note 29, at 72. 
 77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, 1961). 
 78. WOOD, supra note 30, at 386. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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Another threat to republicanism emerged from allowing “the most unfit men 
to shove themselves into stations of influence, where they soon gave way to the 
unrestrained inclination of bad habits.”81  Thus, republics place emphasis on 
electing public officials because of merit and talent.  To the Framers, this concept 
was being perverted throughout the states.82  Instead of being selected on merit, 
state candidates used “connection and favor” to “garner votes,” thus perverting 
republicanism.83 
Politically diverse groups in early America shared these fears.84  Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists, while disagreeing on the ratification of the Constitution, 
both agreed that corruption was an evil that needed to be prevented.85  While the 
Jeffersonians and Federalists attacked each other on policy grounds, they did so 
believing their respective policies protected and enhanced republicanism. 86  
“Republicanism,” John Howe recognized, is “subject to a variety of readings 
when individuals as diverse as Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, and 
John Adams and John Taylor could each claim allegiance to it.” 87   Anti-
Federalist Patrick Henry “feared that our body politic was dangerously sick,”88 
particularly because he believed government officials “were using their public 
positions to fill their own pockets.”89 
Federalists believed the upswell of democratic action was leading to 
corruption, and therefore created a Constitution to mitigate its corrupting effects, 
while still adhering to the ideals of popular government that emanated from the 
Revolution.90  Republicanism emerged from the ratification debates as the new 
nation’s proposed form of government.91  This method of government evades 
precise definition, yet is marked by several features that are embodied in the 
Constitution and shaped by history.  First, elections must be both regular and 
fair.  Unlike in the British Empire, in a republic, legislators cannot be appointed 
                                                        
 81. Id. at 398. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Shalhope, supra note 29, at 72–73. 
 85. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 77, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton) (“One of 
the weak sides of republics . . . is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption.”), with 3 
PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 467 (William Wirt Henry ed., 1969) 
(“Sir, if our senators will not be corrupted, it will be because they will be good men; and not because 
the constitution provides against corruption.”). 
 86. See Shalhope, supra note 29, at 72‒73. 
 87. John R. Howe, Jr., Republican Thought & the Political Violence of the 1790s, 19 AM. Q. 
147, 153 (1967). 
 88. Letter from Patrick Henry to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 15, 1780), reprinted in MOSES COIT 
TYLER, PATRICK HENRY 273 (1888). 
 89. WOOD, supra note 30, at 417. 
 90. Id. at 517. 
 91. For an extensive and thoughtful work on the ratification debates, see PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010). 
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by other government actors, but must be chosen by the people.92  Legislators do 
not serve for life, but rather for particular terms, and are thereafter subject to re-
election by the people.93  Legislators should actively pursue the public good.  
Corruption of government, particularly by legislators serving the interests of one 
or a select few electors at the detriment of others, undercuts and subverts 
republicanism, and should be avoided at all costs. 
C.  Modern Day Republicanism 
In the late 1980s, the legal community experienced a “republican revival,” 
culminating in the 1988 Yale Law Journal Symposium. 94   The Symposium 
brought together preeminent legal scholars, including Cass Sunstein, Kathleen 
Sullivan, Michael Fitts, and Frank Michelman.95   These and other scholars 
explored what republicanism entails, how it is useful in modern constitutional 
analysis, and potential drawbacks of using republicanism as a constitutional 
doctrine.  Cass Sunstein synthesized how republicanism extends beyond the 
mere textual provisions of the Constitution and works to serve an important 
function in the deliberative decision-making processes of our democracy.  His 
work is worth recounting here, as he details modern day implications of 
republicanism that will be explored later in this Article. 
Professor Sunstein asserts that republicanism contains “four central 
commitments”96: (1) deliberation; (2) political equality; (3) universalism; and 
(4) citizenship.97  The relevant “commitments” will be reviewed and applied 
directly to campaign finance regulation later in this Article. 
First, Sunstein argues that deliberation embodies the notion that political 
decision-making should place a premium on the collective discussion and debate 
of the legislature as whole, and that the legislature should resist the urge to seek 
private preferences in favor of the public good.98  A republican government 
encourages the citizenry to review existing legal norms and preferences through 
public discourse and debate.99  Moreover, Sunstein argued that deliberation is 
                                                        
 92. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.  
 93. Id. § 2, cl. 1 & § 3, cl. 1. 
 94. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 25.  This entire volume consists of articles from Yale’s 
Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition. 
 95. See generally Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic 
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651 (1988); Michelman, supra note 25; Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
 96. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 1548. 
 97. Id. at 1548, 1552, 1554‒55. 
 98. Id. at 1549.  This argument reflects the insight of Gordon Wood and is illuminated by 
structural constitutional provisions.  For a review of Wood’s insights, see supra notes 69‒71, 78‒
83 and accompanying text. 
 99. See Sunstein, supra note 95, at 1549. 
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an aspirational goal of the political process; it is not yet fully realized, and will 
not be realized until the political process results in laws serving the public good 
rather than the import of private political preferences. 100  He reasoned that: 
The antonym of deliberation is the imposition of outcomes by self-
interested and politically powerful private groups; republicans 
emphasize that deliberative processes are often undermined by 
intimidation, strategic and manipulative behavior, collective action 
problems, adaptive preferences, or—most generally—disparities in 
political influence. The requirement of deliberation is designed to 
ensure that political outcomes will be supported by reference to a 
consensus (or at least broad agreement) among political equals.101 
Sunstein correctly identifies deliberation as a republican principle; it aligns with 
the historical findings of Gordon Wood,which few have attempted to challenge.  
Moreover, the identification of deliberation’s “antonym” is useful in assessing 
political choices, the way the Supreme Court treats those choices, and how the 
Court has fundamentally misunderstood republicanism and its implications.  
Part IV of this Article will return to Sunstein’s deliberation principle to assess 
First Amendment challenges to campaign finance laws. 
Sunstein’s second principle of republicanism is political equality. 102  
Republicanism, understood as pursuing political equality, requires “that all 
individuals and groups have access to the political process; large disparities in 
political influence are disfavored.”103  When understood in modern terms, this 
concept seems almost self-obvious because denying individuals access to the 
political process without just cause104 is unconstitutional and anti-republican.105  
Sunstein’s work fails to reconcile this principle of modern republicanism with 
the social and political realities of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.  It is 
no secret that the early republic was far from politically equal.106  Blacks were 
                                                        
 100. Id. at 1549‒50. 
 101. Id. at 1550. 
 102. Id. at 1552. 
 103. Id. 
 104. One example of appropriate removal from the political process, at least in the eyes of the 
Supreme Court, is the preclusion of felons from voting in elections.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 
418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).  As of 2011, all but two states have a process for readmitting felons into 
the political process.  See RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: 
STATE DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM, 1997‒2008 27 (Sept. 2008), http://www.sentencing 
project.org/doc/publications/fd_statedisenfranchisement.pdf. 
 105. See Sarah Tran, Cyber-Republicanism, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 383, 411‒12 (2013); see 
also James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 525‒27 (1999). 
 106. See generally Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 
97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988) (discussing in depth why republicanism—as articulated by Sunstein and 
Michelman—fails to reconcile the political reality for blacks in the early republic). 
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still restricted by the bonds of slavery,107 women—with few exceptions108—
were not permitted to vote,109  and property requirements for voting existed 
almost uniformly through the eighteenth and well into the nineteenth century.110  
However, the harsh realities of the early republic should not strip republicanism 
of its usefulness.  Instead, the Constitution should be read as aspirational.  The 
Constitution—and other founding documents, particularly the Declaration of 
Independence—established goals the nation must pursue.  The nation corrected 
America’s “original sin” with the Thirteenth Amendment.111  It also extended 
republicanism to African Americans with the Fifteenth Amendment 112  and 
furthered republican principles with the Seventeenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments.113 
Professor Sunstein’s articulation of republican commitments is helpful in the 
endeavor to fully understand and apply republicanism as an underlying 
                                                        
 107. Not only did slavery prevent the political participation of blacks, but racist sentiments 
restricted free blacks as well.  See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV (1776).  The New Jersey constitution did not require that 
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 110. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 105 (1998).  Tarr wrote 
that after the Revolution, “the original thirteen states restricted the franchise to either freeholders 
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Reconstruction, property and taxpaying requirements came under sustained attack in state 
constitutional conventions.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Both the North and South moved 
rapidly in the direction of universal white suffrage.  Tarr continues: 
The decade following the Civil War marked the high point of suffrage expansion.  The 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 led Northern states to eliminate express 
legal restrictions on black suffrage, although some border states continued efforts to 
contain the black vote. . . . Reconstruction constitutions in the South endorsed universal 
manhood suffrage even before the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 107.  See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY 
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000) (noting the development of voting rights in 
America). 
 111. See, e.g., George M. Fredrickson, America’s Original Sin, in 51 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 34 
(Mar. 25, 2004) (referring to slavery as America’s “original sin”) ; Roger Cohen, Beyond America’s 
Original Sin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/opinion/20 
cohen.html?_r=0.  While the Thirteenth Amendment did not instantaneously achieve the republican 
ideals of the Constitution, it eliminated a large obstacle to a truly republican government by 
forbidding “involuntary servitude.”  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 112. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election of U.S. Senators by the 
people); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (extending the right to vote to women). 
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constitutional principle.  Moreover, his recognition of both deliberation and 
political equality are not only useful in understanding republicanism more 
broadly, but contribute directly to the debate over campaign finance reform.  In 
fact, Sunstein briefly speculated on how these principles might apply to 
campaign finance regulation.  He notes that the Supreme Court failed to consider 
republicanism in Buckley.114  Instead of “hold[ing] that the effort to promote 
deliberation among political equals was insufficiently weighty, or inadequately 
promoted by the legislation at issue; the Court held, much more sweepingly, that 
that effort was illegitimate under the First Amendment.”115  Sunstein argued that 
if the republican principles of deliberation and political equality were 
appropriately considered by the Court, it “would lead to a quite different analysis 
from the marketplace model,” and “campaign finance regulation would be 
treated far more hospitably.”116  The future of campaign finance reform when 
reviewed alongside republicanism, as introduced here by Sunstein’s remarks, 
will be fully explored in Part IV.  This Article now turns to why and how 
republicanism is a tool the Court should add to its interpretive repertoire. 
II.  REPUBLICANISM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
If republicanism is understood as the cornerstone of American government, 
how, if at all, should it be used as a tool by the Supreme Court?  With the only 
mention of republicanism in the Constitution appearing in Article IV and 
applying solely to the states,117 on what grounds can the Court invoke this reality 
of American Constitutionalism?  The Court invokes similar underlying 
constitutional principles and extracts a formula that instructs when and how to 
substitute traditional constitutional analysis with underlying constitutional 
principles, which will be examined further.  A review of Supreme Court cases 
identifies state autonomy, federalism, separation of powers, and sovereign 
immunity as underlying constitutional principles.  Equally important as to what 
principles the Court invokes is how the Court invokes those principles.  While 
the Supreme Court has not frequently invoked underlying constitutional 
principles to interpret laws, when it does so it follows a clear formula: (1) the 
existing doctrinal developments fail to apply directly to the case at hand; and (2) 
a historical inquiry into the constitutional clause in question provides a clear 
answer to the question before the Court.118  This Part will detail how this formula 
developed over the last two decades. 
                                                        
 114. See Sunstein, supra note 95, at 1577. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 118. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 558‒59 (1995). 
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A.  Existing Doctrinal Failures 
In Supreme Court opinions that invoke an underlying constitutional principle 
to help decide a case, the Court first identifies where the existing doctrine went 
awry.  In New York v. United States,119 Justice O’Connor invalidated a provision 
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985.120  The 
Act, passed under the authority conferred to Congress by the Commerce Clause, 
required that states not voluntarily participating in the waste removal program 
“take title to the waste[,] . . . be obligated to take possession of the waste, and . 
. . be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or 
owner . . . of the waste.”121  O’Connor recognized that the case “implicate[d]  
. . . perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law”—the Commerce Clause.122  
O’Connor noted that although the Court has correctly held that the Commerce 
Clause is limited by the constraints of the First Amendment, the Commerce 
power still exceeds its proper confines.123  This First Amendment limitation 
failed to accurately assess the constitutional limitations on the Commerce power, 
thus O’Connor invoked the Tenth Amendment to do so.124  At this point in the 
continuum of the Commerce Clause doctrine, the Court practiced extreme 
deference to the Federal Government. 
This deference began in the early twentieth century with the famous “switch 
in time” by Justice Owen Roberts.  Instead of voting as he did in Morehead v. 
New York125 to strike down a minimum wage law, Justice Roberts reversed 
course and chose to uphold a similar law in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.126  West 
Coast Hotel marked the beginning of an unchecked deference to Congress (in 
the Commerce Clause area), lasting until Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New 
York v. United States.127  Concluding that this deference had resulted in an 
improper application of the Commerce Clause, O’Connor returned to the pre-
West Coast Hotel jurisprudence of the Court.  She cited United States v. Butler128 
                                                        
 119. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 120. Id. at 149. 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2012). 
 122. New York, 505 U.S. at 149. 
 123. Id. at 156. 
 124. Id. at 156‒57; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 125. See Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936); Barry Cushman, 
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Cushman, supra note 125.  See also John W. Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the 
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 128. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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for the proposition that “[t]he question is not what power the Federal 
Government ought to have but what powers in fact have been given by the 
people.”129  According to O’Connor, the decades of unchecked Congressional 
action had led the Commerce Clause down a path never intended, and thus the 
Court needed to steer the Clause back to its proper place by invoking the 
underlying constitutional principles of anti-commandeering and state 
autonomy.130 
Similarly, in United States v. Lopez,131 Chief Justice Rehnquist found the 
Court had extended the Commerce Clause too far, and held the Gun Free Zones 
Act of 1990132  unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.133   Instead of 
applying the existing Commerce Clause framework, Rehnquist “start[ed] with 
first principles” and turned to underlying constitutional principles to invalidate 
the law.134  Had Rehnquist not used this analytical technique, the Act would have 
most likely been upheld.135  However, he found little use in post-New Deal 
Commerce Clause analysis and instead attempted to recapture the proper 
understanding of the Commerce Clause by considering the law in light of 
historical context and originalism.136  Under existing jurisprudence, the Court 
would have questioned whether the law regulated an activity with “a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.”137  In contrast, Rehnquist argued that 
“Wickard [v. Filburn] ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that 
greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that 
Clause”138 and that this development “must be considered in the light of our dual 
system of government and may not be extended.”139  Thus, Rehnquist invoked 
the underlying constitutional principle of federalism to correct the 
                                                        
 129. New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (citing Butler, 297 U.S. at 63). 
 130. See id. at 166, 188. 
 131. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012). 
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misinterpretation of the Commerce Clause that has occurred over the course of 
the twentieth century.140 
B.  Looking Back to Look Ahead: The Historical Inquiry to Discover 
Underlying Constitutional Principles 
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor turned to American history to 
correct the Court’s previous missteps in interpreting the Commerce Clause.  
While the Tenth Amendment limits Congressional authority, O’Connor argued, 
the “limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself.”141  To 
determine the limits of the Commerce Clause, O’Connor turned to the Founding 
Era for answers.  She wrote: 
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have 
been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the 
Framers would not have conceived that any government would 
conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not 
have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, 
would assume such responsibilities.142 
O’Connor conceded that the removal of radioactive waste, the subject of the 
case, was well within the limits of Congressional Authority under the Commerce 
Clause, primarily because “[s]pace in radioactive waste disposal sites is 
frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of another.”143  However, 
the means chosen by Congress to do so were unconstitutional. 144   Again, 
O’Connor turned to the Founding Era to invoke the now famous (or infamous) 
Anti-Commandeering Doctrine.145   She noted that the Framers intentionally 
chose to limit the powers of the Federal Government to regulate individuals, not 
states: “In the end, the Convention opted for a Constitution in which Congress 
would exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals rather than over 
States; for a variety of reasons, it rejected the New Jersey Plan in favor of the 
Virginia Plan.” 146   Because the “take title” provision infringed on state 
autonomy—a concept not textually provided for by the Constitution—the 
provision was unconstitutional.147  This Anti-Commandeering principle is the 
functional equivalent of what this Article calls “underlying constitutional 
principles:” a non-textual provision of the Constitution that limits the expressed 
textual provisions of the Constitution.  In this case, O’Connor found that the 
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power of the Federal Government had expanded too far—thus needing restraint 
by the underlying constitutional principle of state autonomy.148 
In Lopez, the Court also looked back to the Founding Era to correct the 
improper expansion of the Commerce Clause.149  Kennedy, in his concurring 
opinion, argued, “[t]his case requires us to consider our place in the design of 
the Government and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole 
structure of the Constitution.”150  In his analysis of the law’s constitutionality, 
Kennedy relied heavily on early American history, paying specific attention to 
The Federalist.151  He, in no uncertain terms, claimed that these underlying 
constitutional principles demand serious attention and consideration by the 
Court: “The political branches of the Government must fulfill this grave 
constitutional obligation if democratic liberty and the federalism that secures it 
are to endure.”152  The Commerce Clause, according to Kennedy, needed to be 
considered alongside the underlying constitutional principles of federalism and 
separation of powers.153  Only then could the Court accurately determine the 
constitutionality of the Gun Free Zones Act, the subject of the case.154 
More recently, in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State 
Ports Authority (FMC),155 Justice Thomas invoked the underlying constitutional 
principle of state sovereign immunity to preclude the Federal Maritime 
Commission from adjudicating a private individual’s complaint against a state 
agency.156  Justice Thomas held that this principle, not the previously invoked 
Eleventh Amendment, commanded the outcome of the case.157  Thomas, citing 
Kennedy’s majority in Alden v. Maine,158 argued: “The founding generation 
thought it ‘neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, 
invested with that large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated 
to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the 
complaints of private persons.’” 159   Again, invoking this underlying 
constitutional principle required an extensive endeavor to understand early 
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American history.160   Thomas argued that “[s]tates, upon ratification of the 
Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal 
Government.  Rather, they entered the Union ‘with their sovereignty intact.’  An 
integral component of that ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’ retained by 
the States is their immunity from private suits.”161  He then turned to Hamilton’s 
The Federalist Number 81: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit 
of an individual without its consent.  This is the general sense and the 
general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the 
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every 
State of the Union.  Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this 
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the 
States.162 
By relying on the Framers, Thomas concluded that the underlying constitutional 
principle of state sovereign immunity precluding suits by citizens of its state, a 
principle with no textual grounding in the Constitution, commanded the outcome 
of the case at hand. 
While both Alden and FMC contained passionate dissents, neither dissent 
questioned the importance of underlying constitutional principles.  Justice 
Breyer, dissenting in FMC, recognized the need to understand early American 
history: “[U]nless supported by considerations of history, of constitutional 
purpose, or of related consequence, those abstract phrases cannot support 
today’s result.”163  While ultimately concluding that the majority erred in its 
application of history, Breyer still found uncovering history a worthwhile 
endeavor.164   Similarly, Justice Souter in his dissent in Alden turned to the 
Founding Era to determine the Framers’ understanding of sovereign immunity, 
as well as the conception of that doctrine in the pre-revolutionary colonies.  He 
wrote, “[s]tarting in the mid-1760’s, ideas about sovereignty in colonial America 
began to shift as Americans argued that, lacking a voice in Parliament, they had 
not in any express way consented to being taxed.”165 
Thus, when the Court finds that the doctrinal developments of a particular 
clause inadequately capture the implied constitutional restraints on Congress, 
the Court often turns to relevant history to find the appropriate limits on express 
powers.  This Article now examines First Amendment developments in the 
realm of campaign finance and details why the current state of the doctrine fits 
the formula detailed above. 
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III.  FIRST AMENDMENT FAILURES: THE HOUSE OF CARDS CREATED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND WHY THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE ARENA IS RIPE FOR 
REPUBLICANISM 
Campaign finance reform has experienced shifts in judicial treatment for the 
last twenty years.  Recently, Citizens United and McCutcheon altered the 
landscape of this arena tremendously.166   In June 2012, the Supreme Court 
summarily reversed a decision by the Montana Supreme Court that held Citizens 
United did not apply within its territorial limits.167  Citizens United applied 
existing First Amendment doctrine to the case at hand, which led to 
unimaginable consequences.  This Part looks at the consequences of Citizens 
United, and examines the developments of the First Amendment over the past 
two decades, demonstrating why the Court should invoke an underlying 
constitutional principle to correct its misinterpretation of the First Amendment.  
This Part meets this task by: (1) recounting briefly the developments of 
campaign finance case law, beginning with Buckley and culminating in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon; and (2) applying the Court’s formula for invocating an 
underlying constitutional principle.  Buckley and its pre-Citizens United progeny 
laid the foundation for the Supreme Court’s house of cards—a foundation that 
is generally accepted as constitutionally sound.168  However, since 2010, the 
Court has increasingly built the house of cards higher, culminating in the 2014 
McCutcheon decision. 
A.  From Buckley to McCutcheon 
The Supreme Court first took up a First Amendment challenge to campaign 
finance legislation in 1976 in Buckley.169  In 1971, Congress passed the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA), which placed restrictions on individual 
contributions to political candidates and personal expenditures by candidates 
during election cycles. 170   A group of candidates for federal public office 
challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the restrictions 
on individual contributions violated the Free Speech clause.171  The Court began 
its opinion by stating that the legislation in question “operate[s] in an area of the 
most fundamental First Amendment activities,” and thus this political activity is 
“afford[ed] the broadest protection.” 172   The Government defended the 
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legislation by arguing that it served to prevent “corruption and the appearance 
of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large 
financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to 
office.”173  The Supreme Court agreed that this was an end that Congress could 
legitimately pursue, but did not uphold the legislation entirely.  Rather, the 
Supreme Court upheld the provisions restricting individual contributions and 
requiring reporting and disclosure of those contributions, but struck down the 
provisions limiting expenditures by candidates and campaigns.174  The legal 
theories underpinning this decision will be detailed later in this section, but it is 
worth briefly highlighting them here.  The most important development from 
Buckley was the principle that money is speech.175  The Court rejected wholesale 
the argument that the contribution of money to political campaigns is conduct, 
not speech.176  With the Court defining political contributions and expenditures 
as speech under the First Amendment, the burden on the Government to restrict 
such speech increased exponentially.  The Government’s interest in preventing 
quid pro quo corruption likely meets this high burden.177  The Court found that 
while “the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate 
fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose 
significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political 
expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.”178  
Thus, the Court upheld contribution limits but struck down independent 
expenditure limits. 
Two years later, the Court returned to campaign finance reform legislation in 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.179  Massachusetts passed a criminal 
statute that stated: 
No corporation . . . shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or 
contribute, or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money 
or other valuable thing for the purpose of aiding, promoting or 
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preventing the nomination or election of any person to public office, 
or aiding or promoting or antagonizing the interest of any political 
party.180 
A corporation that violated the statute faced a maximum penalty of $50,000, and 
officers or other violators faced potential jail time.181  Two banking institutions 
and three business corporations challenged this law, arguing that it both 
restricted the First Amendment rights of their respective institutions and violated 
their Fourteenth Amendment rights.182  The challengers sought to advertise their 
views on a proposed constitutional amendment that was scheduled to be voted 
on by the citizens of Massachusetts. 183   The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts framed the question as whether or not corporations have First 
Amendment rights,184 but the Supreme Court held this was the wrong inquiry.185  
It held, instead, that corporations enjoy the full protection of the First 
Amendment ensured to citizens: 
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that 
the State could silence their proposed speech.  It is the type of speech 
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less 
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an 
individual.  The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its 
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.186 
The Court then asked “whether [the Act] abridges expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.”187  The Court found 
no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions 
of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be 
within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection 
simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the 
satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property.188 
Bellotti will be further discussed in this Part, but it is important to note here 
that the Court held that (1) corporations have First Amendment rights,189 (2) 
those rights cannot be restricted to participating in “speech” solely related to 
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their corporate interests,190 and (3) any attempt to curtail those rights must pass 
the strict scrutiny test of the Court.191 
The Supreme Court continued to develop its jurisprudence of campaign 
finance in 1986.  In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life,192 the Court struck down another provision of FECA as applied to a specific 
corporation. 193   Section 441b forbade corporations from making any 
expenditures from treasury funds of the corporation “in connection with” any 
candidates for federal office. 194   In 1978, Massachusetts Citizens for Life 
circulated a newsletter urging members to vote “pro-life” in the upcoming 
election.195  The newsletter identified candidates for public office and rated them 
according to their record on pro-life issues. 196   The FEC argued that this 
circulation violated section 441b, and the Court agreed.197  However, the Court 
then turned to the constitutionality of that section.  The Court found that the 
effect of 441b on the corporation was to “make engaging in protected speech a 
severely demanding task.”198  The Court concluded: 
[W]e must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as 
we are against its sweeping restriction. Where at all possible, 
government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet 
the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech 
that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation.  In enacting 
the provision at issue in this case, Congress has chosen too blunt an 
instrument for such a delicate task.199 
While the Court ultimately concluded the provision of FECA 
unconstitutionally burdened the corporation in Citizens for Life, it articulated a 
test for determining future restrictions upon the speech rights of corporations: 
(1) whether the organization in question was formed to promote political ideas; 
(2) the organization does not have shareholders; and (3) the organization was 
neither formed by, nor accepts donations from, corporations or labor unions.200 
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In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 201  the Court applied the 
Citizens for Life test to uphold a state restriction on corporations.202  In 1976, 
Michigan passed campaign finance reform legislation to limit the potential 
negative impact of corporate money in state campaigns for public office.203  In 
1985, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce—a collection of over 8,000 
members—challenged section 54(1) of the Act on First Amendment grounds.204  
Section 54(1) prevented corporations from “making contributions and 
independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections.”205  The 
Chamber attempted to use its general treasury funds to run a newspaper 
advertisement supporting a specific candidate for public office.206  The Chamber 
argued that the law unconstitutionally restricted its ability to participate in 
political speech; relying on the Court’s decision in Citizens for Life, it sought 
injunctive relief against enforcement of the Act.207  The Court in Austin agreed 
that Citizens For Life provided the pertinent analysis for the case at hand, but 
held in favor of Michigan.208  Justice Marshall distinguished the facts from 
Citizens for Life, holding: 
The final characteristic upon which we relied in [Citizens for Life] was 
the organization’s independence from the influence of business 
corporations.  On this score, the Chamber differs most greatly from 
the Massachusetts organization.  [Citizens for Life] was not established 
by, and had a policy of not accepting contributions from, business 
corporations.  Thus it could not “serv[e] as [a] condui[t] for the type 
of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace.”209 
Justice Marshall upheld the Michigan law, finding that it served a compelling 
state interest—limiting the potential that corporate money would undermine the 
political process—and the means chosen were narrowly tailored to that end.210  
More importantly, the Austin Court began to erode the Court’s previous reliance 
on quid pro quo corruption to justify state interference with the political process.  
Justice Marshall held: 
Regardless of whether this danger of “financial quid pro quo” 
corruption, may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent 
expenditures, Michigan’s regulation aims at a different type of 
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corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of 
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.211 
Austin thus signaled a shift in the Court’s analysis of campaign finance 
legislation, which was continued in the next major campaign finance case heard 
by the Court, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.212  In 2002, Congress 
amended FECA with the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(“BCRA”).213  BCRA was a comprehensive attempt to close the effects of “soft 
money” in the election process and to enhance disclosure requirements by 
expanding FECA to include “electioneering communication” and increasing the 
level of detail and frequency with which contributors disclose financial 
contributions to political campaigns.214  The 272-page decision is difficult to 
recount here, but the Court upheld key provisions of the Act, including the 
provisions closing the “soft money” loopholes.215  In analyzing the law, Justice 
Stevens paid close attention to the facts provided in the record, specifically those 
facts that highlighted the corrupting effects of unrestricted soft money.216  He 
argued: 
The question for present purposes is whether large soft-money 
contributions to national party committees have a corrupting influence 
or give rise to the appearance of corruption.  Both common sense and 
the ample record in these cases confirm Congress’ belief that they do. 
. . . The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike 
have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase 
their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of 
officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing 
intermediaries.217 
Stevens held that the record before Congress justified the restrictions on soft 
money, and thus met the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.218  He found 
“[p]articularly telling . . . the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the 
top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties, 
leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking 
influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular 
ideology.”219 
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The plaintiffs in McConnell believed that this factual showing was not enough 
to justify the restrictions.  They argued that without demonstrating that an actual 
public official switched votes because of the donations, or that the public 
believes they have, there is no actual or apparent corruption.220  The Stevens 
majority rejected this argument, finding instead that the definition of 
“corruption” used by the plaintiffs was too narrow.  Stevens explained: 
[Corruption] extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes 
corruption to curbing “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, 
and the appearance of such influence.”  Many of the “deeply 
disturbing examples” of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to 
justify FECA’s contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, 
but evidence that various corporate interests had given substantial 
donations to gain access to high-level government officials.221 
McConnell continued the Court’s approach to campaign finance legislation 
stemming from Austin, thus establishing a seventeen-year precedent for 
upholding campaign finance restrictions on corporations. 
B.  Building the House of Cards 
The Court laid the foundation of the house of cards with its decisions from 
Buckley to McConnell.  As is the case with a literal house of cards, the first level 
is generally sturdy.  Buckley announced general principles that balanced the 
interests of the government in preventing corruption with the First Amendment 
right to engage in political speech.222  However, starting in 2007, the Court 
placed card after card upon that sturdy foundation.  In doing so, the Court not 
only weakened that foundation, but created an entire campaign finance regime 
that ignores the underlying constitutional principle of republicanism. 
The development of the unconstitutional house of cards began in 2007.  In 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL),223 the Court 
carved out a narrow exception to the McConnell ruling, allowing as-applied 
challenges to the “black out” provision of BCRA that forbade electioneering 
communications thirty days before a primary election.224  WRTL sought to run 
“issue advocacy” advertisements urging Wisconsin senators to oppose the 
filibuster of judicial nominees. 225   Under the McConnell framework, this 
communication would be prohibited because it used general treasury funds to 
advocate a specific stance or action on a political issue.  However, Justice 
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Roberts—without completely overturning McConnell—held that the application 
of section 203 of BCRA to WRTL was unconstitutional.226  Roberts held that 
“[b]ecause WRTL’s ads may reasonably be interpreted as something other than 
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate, we hold they are not the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy, and therefore fall outside the scope 
of McConnell’s holding.” 227   The Court drew a hard line between “issue 
advocacy ads” and “express advocacy ads.”228  The latter was properly limited 
by McConnell, but the former cannot be held to the same standard McConnell 
articulated. Legislation restricting expenditures for issue advocacy ads must 
articulate a different compelling state interest than just preventing quid pro quo 
corruption because the Court held those ads do not give rise to such improper 
actions by legislators.229  The Roberts majority also took the opportunity to 
reaffirm the central holding of Bellotti, that corporations enjoy the full 
protections of the First Amendment.230  This reaffirmation led to the Court’s 
reevaluation of BCRA in Citizens United. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided arguably the most controversial case of 
the Roberts Court.231  In Citizens United, the Court struck down the previously 
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affirmed provision of BCRA, Section 203, that forbade independent 
expenditures by corporations and unions. 232   Citizens United, a non-profit 
corporation, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to permit the running of 
television advertisements for its documentary, Hillary: The Movie, which—
without explicitly telling voters not to vote for Hillary Clinton—encouraged 
voters to reconsider supporting her in the primary election for the presidency.233  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, saw this case as an opportunity to 
reconsider both Austin and McConnell.234  Instead of overruling Austin on a 
narrow ground by finding that Section 203 did not apply to Hillary, the Court 
broadly held that the relevant provisions of BCRA were unconstitutional.235  
Justice Kennedy concluded that “there is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary 
other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton.  Under the standard 
stated in McConnell and further elaborated in WRTL, the film qualifies as the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.”236  Kennedy, after clearing the way 
for a reevaluation of Austin and McConnell, found the BCRA provisions in 
question were unconstitutional. 237   He held that BCRA’s “prohibition on 
corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech.” 238   Kennedy 
looked to “history and logic” “for the proposition that, in the context of political 
speech, the Government may [not] impose restrictions on certain disfavored 
speakers.”239  However, his historical analysis, which will be reviewed in greater 
length in Part IV, was particularly underwhelming.  He held: 
There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as 
originally understood, would permit the suppression of political 
speech by media corporations. . . . At the founding, speech was open, 
comprehensive, and vital to society’s definition of itself; there were 
no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge.240 
Kennedy also reverted to the proposition in Buckley that only quid pro quo 
corruption is an end that Congress can legitimately legislate to prevent.241  He 
refused to consider how independent expenditures might give rise to quid pro 
quo arrangements and subsequently ruled in favor of Citizens United.242  In so 
doing, the Court not only overturned well-established precedent, but also 
permitted corporations to have unprecedented influence in the electoral process. 
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The latest growth of the house of cards came in McCutcheon, in which Shaun 
McCutcheon, an active Republican from Alabama, challenged key components 
of FECA. 243   He alleged that the current biennial limits on individual 
contributions violated his Constitutional rights. 244   He was joined by the 
Republican National Committee (RNC), which challenged the limits on 
contributions to national political committees.245  FECA imposed an aggregate 
limit on candidate contributions of $46,200 and an aggregate limit on “other” 
contributions of $70,800.246  A three-judge panel for the D.C. District Court held 
that the limits on individual expenditures did not violate the First Amendment.247  
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the contribution limits in FECA 
should be subject to strict scrutiny.248  McCutcheon and the RNC argued that in 
Buckley, the Court improperly drew a line between expenditures and 
contributions.249  Under the Buckley framework, expenditure limits are subject 
to strict scrutiny, 250  while under McConnell, contribution limits need only 
satisfy “the lesser demand of being closely drawn to match a sufficiently 
important interest.”251 
McCutcheon and the RNC argued that contribution limits, like expenditures, 
“similarly burden First Amendment rights.” 252   The court rejected this 
proposition, holding: 
The difference between contributions and expenditures is the 
difference between giving money to an entity and spending that money 
directly on advocacy.  Contribution limits are subject to lower scrutiny 
because they primarily implicate the First Amendment rights of 
association, not expression, and contributors remain able to vindicate 
their associational interests in other ways.253 
The court did recognize, however, that “Citizens United left unclear the 
constitutionally permissible scope of the government’s anticorruption 
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interest.”254  The court left this determination to the Supreme Court,255 which 
subsequently granted cert to decide this question.256 
What the Supreme Court left unclear in Citizens United was made very clear 
in McCutcheon: the only constitutionally permissible anticorruption interest is 
preventing quid pro quo corruption and the appearance thereof.257  Chief Justice 
Roberts—invalidating the aggregate limits on individual donations—stated: 
Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not 
in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s 
official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.  Nor 
does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may 
garner influence over or access to elected officials or political 
parties.258 
This brief259 history of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence traces the 
construction of the campaign finance house of cards.  The next section more 
thoroughly investigates the legal theories underpinning the Court’s decisions.  It 
focuses on two First Amendment theories that permeate all of the campaign 
finance cases: Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “marketplace of ideas,” articulated in 
Abrams v. United States, 260  and Louis Brandeis’s “more speech” theory, 
articulated in Whitney v. California.261  These jurisprudential developments of 
the First Amendment signal a “wrong turn” in the Court’s jurisprudence and 
demonstrate why the Court must find a new theory to decide these difficult cases.  
That theory is the underlying constitutional principle of republicanism. 
C.  The Marketplace of Ideas: How Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” Has Been 
Conflated with Justice Holmes’s Theory of Speech Analysis 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes first articulated the “marketplace of ideas” 
theory in his dissenting opinion in Abrams.262  Holmes argued that rather than 
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regulating speech, the “ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.”263  Holmes continued: 
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught 
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference 
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate 
check is required to save the country.264 
To Holmes, speech should generally be unregulated and allowed to compete 
in the “marketplace” unless regulation is needed to prevent serious harm to the 
country.  Holmes’s metaphor of a free marketplace of ideas has developed in 
subsequent decades to suggest that it should operate as an economic 
marketplace; that is, just as markets were largely unregulated in the early 
twentieth century by the federal government, so too should the marketplace of 
ideas be free from government interference.265 
The Supreme Court has employed the marketplace of ideas analysis in many 
recent cases addressing campaign finance.266  In Bellotti, Justice Powell found 
corporate participation in political speech protected under the First Amendment 
because of the government’s inability to limit “public access to discussion, 
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.”267  Justice White, in 
dissent, directly addressed Holmes’s marketplace theory.  Suggesting that the 
Massachusetts legislature was justified in limiting corporate political activity, he 
wrote, “[s]uch expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of 
the First Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.”268  In Austin, 
the Court upheld limits on a corporation’s ability to “obtain an unfair advantage 
in the political marketplace.” 269   In McConnell, the majority declared the 
marketplace approach a “precious First Amendment value” because it promotes 
“citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace.”270  
Most recently, in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy overturned the Court’s 
decision in Austin by relying on the marketplace theory.271  He stated, “[a]ll 
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the 
economic marketplace to fund their speech.  The First Amendment protects the 
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resulting speech,” and concluded, “Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ 
of ideas protected by the First Amendment.”272  Because Holmes’s marketplace 
theory permeates the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, it is necessary to 
investigate what Holmes’s theory entailed, and if the Court properly invoked his 
theory in the cases above. 
It is unfortunate that Holmes used the word “market” in Abrams, as the 
treatment of the marketplace of ideas has been equated to an Adam Smith-esque 
marketplace, guided merely by the “invisible hand,” free from government 
regulation.273  Even if Holmes intended to import Smith’s marketplace theory to 
free speech analysis, which is doubtful,274 Adam Smith himself did not adopt 
such a hard-and-fast rule of laissez-faire markets.  Rather, Smith’s economic 
theory was “quite qualified and nuanced.”275  Historians have demonstrated that 
the tendency to attribute the laissez-faire approach to Smith is misguided and 
inappropriate.276  Heinz Lubasz argues that economists have irresponsibly read 
Smith’s work and distorted his economic theory. 277   He argues that 
“[u]nderstood in the context of Smith’s thinking, the invisible hand . . . succeeds 
in bringing it about that the interests of all the orders or classes of the society are 
in fact promoted.”278  Smith’s Wealth of Nations cannot be read in isolation of 
his other works. 
In 1759, Smith published The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which emphasized 
the need for individual virtue, even when pursuing individual wealth.279  Smith 
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argued, “[h]ow selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render 
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it.” 280   The commercial success of Wealth of Nations 
distracted readers from Smith’s earlier work, which must be read to fully 
comprehend his theories.  When read as a whole, Smith did not support the 
operation of markets without government interference at all costs; rather, Smith 
was primarily concerned with the betterment of society as a whole.281  Free 
markets are only a means to an end—bettering society—not an end in and of 
itself.  In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith clearly articulates his goals for 
society and how the open marketplace achieves those ends.  His lengthy 
discussion is worth recounting here: 
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and 
agreeable.  They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of 
their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own 
conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours 
of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their 
own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce 
of all their improvements.  They are led by an invisible hand to make 
nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would 
have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among 
all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, 
advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the 
multiplication of the species.282 
This passage demonstrates that the ultimate end that the open marketplace 
pursues is not the aggregation of wealth, but rather an equitable distribution of 
goods.  Moreover, noted historian James Kloppenberg bolsters this claim by 
reconciling the appeared tension between Wealth of Nations and Theory of 
Moral Sentiments.  He writes: 
Smith’s purpose is distorted when the market mechanism he 
envisioned as a means to a moral end is presented as itself the goal of 
political economy.  This interpretation of the Wealth of Nations 
resolves the thorniest part of the Adam Smith problem by suggesting 
that Smith expected a market economy to make possible the virtue he 
examined in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.283 
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If Holmes’s marketplace was properly read to capture the entirety of Smith’s 
economic and political philosophy, campaign finance legislation would fare 
much better before the Court. 
However, the Supreme Court has fallen into the trap of applying Smith’s 
marketplace theory to Holmes’s mention of markets in Abrams.  Professor Kerr 
notes that in Bellotti, the Court contradicted Smith’s free-market principles.  He 
argues: “In essence, Justice Powell’s reasoning went, opening up the 
marketplace of ideas to more corporate political media spending would advance 
the First Amendment role of making that market freer and providing more ideas 
and information to political debate on public issues.” 284   Professor Kerr 
recognizes the danger of applying Smith’s theory without the larger 
understanding of Smith as a thinker of the Scottish Enlightenment: “Smith’s 
concepts do emphasize openness and similar opportunities for all competitors in 
the economic marketplace.  Yet rather than laissez-faire economics, he stressed 
that the efforts of the most powerful competitors can be expected to work against 
maintaining freedom of competition in the marketplace.”285  Corporations are 
unique competitors insofar as they amass wealth at a much faster rate than 
private individuals, thus making them a “powerful competitor” in the political 
marketplace.  This status as a powerful competitor, Smith’s theory suggests, 
should deliver the Court a healthy dose of skepticism when determining the 
constitutionality of laws regulating powerful competitors’ participation in the 
marketplace.286  However, the Court’s misinterpretation of Smith has resulted in 
no such skepticism.  The Court has merely rejected attempts to limit these 
powerful players by finding that every speaker has a right to enter the 
marketplace of ideas. 
This Article does not suggest that the marketplace theory has no place in the 
canon of free speech analysis.  On the contrary, applying the marketplace theory 
has been at the heart of Supreme Court analysis for decades, and has resulted in 
cases being objectively correct.  Rather, the marketplace analysis has no place 
in campaign finance law cases.  The Court has imported a meaning to Holmes’s 
analogy it simply cannot bear.  The Court in Citizens United held that 
corporations cannot be limited in the political arena because a free marketplace 
would not permit forbidding one speaker to compete.287  It is unclear if Holmes 
intended to create such a hard-and-fast rule for government regulation, but the 
Court has subsequently imported this meaning to him.288  If Smith is taken for 
all he’s worth, the question the Court should ask is not whether a speaker has 
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been restricted in the marketplace, but rather, has the regulation brought about 
the betterment of society.  This analysis is noticeably absent from the Court’s 
opinion in Citizens United, which continues the trend of inaccurately using 
Holmes’s marketplace theory in campaign finance cases. 
Moreover, the Court’s misuse of Smith is not only an injustice to Smith, but 
also to Holmes.  By taking Holmes’s marketplace theory to reflect Smith’s 
theories, the Court forgets Holmes’s hesitance to adopt one economic theory to 
decide cases.  In Lochner v. New York, 289  perhaps Holmes’s most famous 
dissent, he declared the Constitution “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics.”290  If Holmes refused to enact Spencer’s theory, why would he 
so readily enact Smith’s?  This question magnifies the Court’s misreading of 
Holmes’s marketplace concept, and demonstrates why the marketplace theory 
has no place in deciding campaign finance cases as it is currently understood by 
the Court.  When the Court used Holmes’s marketplace theory in Citizens United 
to invalidate substantial portions of the BCRA, it took the First Amendment 
down an improper path. 
D.  Whitney’s “More Speech” Approach to the First Amendment 
Justice Louis Brandeis shaped future First Amendment analysis in his 
concurring opinion in Whitney.291  Brandeis argued that if particular speech is 
undesirable, and “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies [of that speech], to avert the evil by the processes of education, the 
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”292  This approach 
has been persuasive to the Supreme Court, resulting in numerous laws being 
struck down because they tend to create less speech rather than more.293  In the 
realm of campaign finance, conservatives have argued against limitations on 
corporations because doing so reduces the quantity of speech present in political 
debate.294  In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy harkened back to Brandeis’s 
theory, stating: “The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply with the 
First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, 
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is the governing rule.”295  The little praise Citizens United receives is generally 
on this point: by permitting corporations to expend as much money as they 
desire, more speech enters the marketplace, thus reinforcing the Brandesian view 
of the First Amendment.296  Professor Joel Gora states this point succinctly: 
“The First Amendment has always been based on the idea that the more speech 
we have, the better off we are, as individuals and as a people.  The Citizens 
United decision eloquently reaffirms and re-enforces that core constitutional 
principle.” 297   Is this the correct characterization of Citizens United?  
Developments after the decision provide a clear and resounding answer: no. 
The most obvious development in the wake of Citizens United is the rise of 
Super Political Action Committees (PACs).298  Super PACs are permitted to 
raise and spend unlimited amounts of money to further the election of a political 
candidate for office, given they do not coordinate with the candidate’s official 
party.299  While the Court did not squarely address the rise of Super PACs in 
Citizens United, it passively affirmed their constitutionality by denying cert in 
Keating.300  This denial came after a decision by the D.C. Circuit Court affirming 
the constitutionality of Super PACs in Speechnow.org v. Federal Election 
Commission. 301   In Speechnow.org, a nonprofit association challenged the 
contribution limits of individuals to political committees by FECA as a violation 
of the First Amendment.302  The D.C. Circuit agreed, thus igniting exorbitant 
donations to Super PACs.303  Conservatives again praised this development as 
reaffirming the core First Amendment theory that “more speech” should be 
promoted in the political arena.304 
What are the implications of the rise of Super PACs?  For starters, the money 
spent in the 2012 presidential election, both by PACs and individual candidates’ 
fundraising efforts, surpassed previous records of money spent to win an 
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election.305  For the 2012 election cycle, 266 groups registered as Super PACs, 
with receipts totaling over 546 million dollars.306  “Restore Our Future,” the 
Super PAC supporting Governor Mitt Romney, raised over 153 million dollars 
and spent over 142 million during the election.307  “Winning Our Future,” the 
Gingrich PAC, collected over 23 million dollars. 308   The Obama PAC, 
“Priorities USA Action,” raised roughly 79 million dollars, and spent over 65 
million during the election.309  Advocates of increased money in politics might 
respond, “so what? This only demonstrates that more speech is the direct result 
of Citizens United and its progeny!”  While a compelling argument to the passive 
follower of politics, the political realist should be terrified by this development.  
Of the money raised by Republican-backing Super PACs, fifty-nine donors have 
contributed $500,000 or more.310  Of those donors, forty-one are individuals, 
nine are corporations, seven are unions, and two are trade associations. 311  
Professor Rick Hasen claims that “Super PACs are for the 1 percent.”312  The 
wealthiest of Americans are attempting to shape the outcome of primary 
elections in order to find favorable policies if their candidate of choice wins the 
presidency.  Sheldon Adelson, casino mogul and eighth richest man in America, 
admitted this reality: “I’m against very wealthy people attempting to or 
influencing elections, [b]ut as long as it’s doable I’m going to do it.”313  He 
subsequently contributed over 93 million dollars to campaigns.314  Lee Drutman, 
writer for the Sunlight Foundation Blog, compiled the data released by the FEC 
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and found that “the One Percent of the One Percent” are the ones funding 
elections.315  The author notes: 
The One Percent of the One Percent are not average Americans.  
Overwhelmingly, they are corporate executives, investors, lobbyists, 
and lawyers.  A good number appear to be highly ideological.  They 
give to multiple candidates and to parties and independent issue 
groups.  They tend to cluster in a limited number of metropolitan zip 
codes, especially in New York, Washington, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles.316 
Perhaps more worrisome is the fact that these donors are not merely writing 
their checks and going home; rather, through donations they have gained unique 
access to the candidates they support.317  Drutman continues: 
Unlike the other 99.99% of Americans who do not make these 
contributions, these elite donors have unique access.  In a world of 
increasingly expensive campaigns, The One Percent of the One 
Percent effectively play the role of political gatekeepers.  Prospective 
candidates need to be able to tap into these networks if they want to 
be taken seriously.  And party leaders on both sides are keenly aware 
that more than 80% of party committee money now comes from these 
elite donors.318 
Even Sheldon Adelson, who spent nearly 100 million dollars supporting a 
candidate who lost the presidential election, still gained this unique access.  
Steven Bertoni notes: 
While only one of the Adelson-backed candidates, incumbent senator 
Dean Heller (R, NV), won on November 6th, Adelson’s $53 million 
donation was a bargain.  It bought Adelson a direct line into every 
politician—and media outlet—in America, no matter their party 
affiliation.  When Adelson calls, you’re going to pick up the phone. 
And pick it up fast.  Just ask Newt Gingrich and Mitt Romney and 
even Harry Reid.  That $53 million worth of donations, just 0.25% of 
his wealth, has made Sheldon Adelson a player.319 
What has been characterized as “more speech” is actually the speech of a few, 
most, if not all, of whom had their speech already present in the political arena.  
This can hardly be described as “more speech” under the Brandesian theory. 
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With the prevalent use of television advertising, the story becomes even 
grimmer; with PACs competing for airtime, networks will be in a unique 
position to drive up the price for advertising.  The result?  The overwhelming 
majority of less wealthy Americans will be unable to participate in the most 
common form of political dialogue.  Advertising will be ruled by the rich, while 
those without millions or possibly billions of dollars will be left sitting on their 
couch, watching the rich set the parameters of public discourse.  McCutcheon 
exponentially magnifies these issues.  Now, not only do corporations have the 
ability to exert influence over elected officials, but wealthy individuals are no 
longer restrained by aggregate limits on donations.320 
While Citizens United may appear to enhance the Brandesian theory of “more 
speech,” a simple analysis of the facts demonstrates otherwise.  Critics of the 
political process have often griped that the rich run the show; but today, more 
than ever before, the rich are the ones with the most influence in the political 
arena.321  Unless more speech is measured by pure dollars and cents, the Court 
cannot claim that its decisions in campaign finance cases fulfill Brandeis’s 
vision of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
E.  So What Is to Be Done? 
Core First Amendment principles, the “marketplace of ideas” and promoting 
“more speech,” do not apply to the realm of campaign finance.  Though powerful 
analytical tools that are useful in other arenas, these principles have no place in 
modern debates about the First Amendment and campaign finance.  Using these 
tools led to the Court’s misapplication of the First Amendment.  This discussion 
is reminiscent of the Court’s improper development of the Commerce Clause 
and other areas of the law discussed in Part II.  Just as the Court turned to history 
to remedy the Court’s missteps, so too should the Court turn to history to set the 
First Amendment back on its proper course in the realm of campaign finance.  
The next Part applies republicanism to campaign finance and serves as a model 
for future challenges to campaign finance legislation, both at the state and 
federal level. 
IV.  MAKING HISTORY USEFUL: APPLYING REPUBLICANISM TO CITIZENS 
UNITED, MCCUTCHEON, AND FUTURE CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASES 
Having demonstrated why the First Amendment fails to offer adequate 
guidelines in campaign finance cases, the Court should invoke republicanism to 
decide future campaign finance cases.  This Part applies republicanism to 
Citizens United and McCutcheon, details how the Court should have decided 
those cases, and explores how republicanism should be applied by the Court in 
the future. 
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A.  Citizens United and McCutcheon: What the Court Should Have Done 
Had the Court applied republicanism to Citizens United and McCutcheon, the 
composition of the majority opinions would likely be very different.  Kennedy’s 
opinion in Citizens United would likely have been joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Souter, and Stevens.  Both opinions would have quickly established why 
the First Amendment cannot be the sole tool for analysis by the Court.322  While 
on the surface this claim might seem controversial and highly unlikely, Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudence demonstrates his willingness to take a holistic 
approach when deciding cases.  History demonstrates he does not always feel 
constrained by either precedent or the text of the Constitution.  Kennedy joined 
the Court’s opinions in both New York and Lopez, thus demonstrating the value 
he places on historical analysis when deciding cases. 323   In the realm of 
sovereign immunity, as previously described, Justice Kennedy relied on 
underlying constitutional principles, not the text or precedent, to find citizens of 
a state unable to sue their state.324  Moreover, he could return to century-old 
cases to find legitimate fear of corruption in government.  In Ex Parte 
Yarbrough,325 the Court did most of the heavy lifting for Kennedy.  Justice 
Miller said: 
[A] government whose essential character is republican, whose 
executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most 
numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the 
people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this 
election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is 
a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest 
consideration.326 
Relying on this opinion, the distinction in Buckley between actionable and 
inactionable corruption would quickly fade away.327  Instead of seeking quid pro 
quo corruption, the Court in Yarbrough sought to rid the political process of 
anything likely to unduly influence candidates for office.328  Just as Americans 
in the early republic were fearful of individuals “instructing” their legislators, so 
too should the current Court be wary of individuals and corporations gaining 
access and influence to legislators because of their large monetary expenditures.  
Current First Amendment jurisprudence does not command this analysis; rather, 
such a result occurs only by using republicanism as the tool for review. 
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Having discarded the First Amendment as the sole means for analysis, what 
sort of inquiries should the Court make to determine how republicanism should 
apply?  First and foremost, a serious factual inquiry into the presence of 
unregulated money in politics is necessary to determine the risk of corruption.  
Professor Teachout notes to what extent such an inquiry was lacking from 
Kennedy’s majority in Citizens United.  She writes: 
One of the more striking—and disturbing—aspects of Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion was how removed it felt from political 
realities; how distant from the experience of what it means to be a 
political candidate, or a politician, or someone who wants to influence 
policy; how alien the description of politics is to a staffer or someone 
in the public affairs branch of a corporation, or to anyone who has tried 
to influence public policy.  It suffers from a failure to describe real 
pressures, and the way those pressures directly interfere with 
representative government in devastating ways.329 
Justice Stevens lamented in his dissent that Kennedy’s assertion that the 
factual record showed no corruption is inaccurate.330  Rather, Stevens explained: 
In this case, the record is not simply incomplete or unsatisfactory; it is 
nonexistent. Congress crafted BCRA in response to a virtual mountain 
of research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to 
avert. The Court now negates Congress’ efforts without a shred of 
evidence on how § 203 or its state-law counterparts have been 
affecting any entity other than Citizens United.331 
Kennedy’s opinion would correct this error by either remanding the case to the 
trial level to develop a factual record, or embarking on a factual determination 
of his own.332  After a factual finding and eradicating the dichotomy between 
actual corruption in the form of quid pro quo relations and “other” corruption, it 
is likely that the case would come out differently.  Republicanism is the catalyst 
for this change in doctrine. 
If Citizens United’s factual record was scarce, McCutcheon’s factual record 
was non-existent.333  Unfortunately, the Court again missed a prime opportunity 
to deconstruct the campaign finance house of cards.  In fact, this point was raised 
during oral arguments.334  McCutcheon reached the Supreme Court on a motion 
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to dismiss,335 which precluded the lower court from the opportunity to inquire 
into the corruption claims made by the government.  Justice Breyer flagged this 
fact as troublesome during oral arguments: “Here, there is no record showing 
whether [the aggregate limit] does or does not have the same tendency [to create 
undue influence].”336  Justice Sotomayor raised similar concerns, specifically 
that “we’re talking in the abstract . . . [w]e don’t have a record below.”337 
While some justices were rightfully concerned with identifying the real effects 
of money in politics, the Chief Justice and his majority were not so concerned.338  
By stating that the only actionable corruption is quid pro quo corruption, the 
Court required evidence of nefarious activity.  By drawing this line in the sand, 
the Court effectively puts its head in the sand.  The majority opinion refuses to 
acknowledge that political corruption can exist undetected.  Roberts wrote, 
“[b]ut the cited sources do not provide any real-world examples.”339  Not only 
is a lack of evidence grounds enough to strike down campaign finance 
restrictions, but the majority cannot even conceive of how such political 
corruption would occur.  Roberts continued: “On a more basic level, it is hard to 
believe that a rational actor would engage in such machinations.”340 
Republicanism does not permit such unimaginative thinking.  Rather, it would 
turn directly to the facts presented; and more importantly, it would require the 
Court to address the political realities of the time.  Just as the Framers drafted 
the Constitution in light of the political realities of the late eighteenth century,341 
the Court should likewise apply republicanism in light of the current political 
environment. 
Republicanism corrects this hard and fast rule created by the Supreme Court.  
Republicanism takes into consideration the political realities of the time and is 
inherently dubious of excessive participation in political campaigns. 
In addition to an intense factual inquiry, the Court should turn to historical 
analysis when applying republicanism.  The historical inquiry in Part I could be 
applied wholesale by Kennedy.  By returning to the pre-revolutionary period, 
Kennedy would quickly discern how corruption in government was a real fear 
of the colonists.  Recall the fears of Benjamin Franklin expressed in his letter to 
Joseph Galloway.342  At the Constitutional Convention, George Mason echoed 
these fears: “[I]f we do not provide against corruption, our government will soon 
be at an end.” 343   Finally, and perhaps most useful to Kennedy, are the 
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justifications for republicanism in The Federalist.  James Madison argued that 
the government must prevent the “cabals of the few” from legislating in their 
own self-interest.344  Alexander Hamilton made a similar claim, predicting that 
“compensation[]” would cause representatives to “betray” the trust of the 
public.345 
Hamilton was acutely aware of the corrupting influences of money in politics.  
With the rise of corporate and individual donors after Citizens United and 
McCutcheon, 346  Hamilton’s claims should justify the Court’s invocation of 
republicanism in future campaign finance cases.  As detailed in Part III, the 
wealthy donors are not simply donating money and going home, but rather enjoy 
unique access to the elected representatives.  This access inevitably leads to the 
sort of arrangements the Constitution seeks to avoid: the few dictating the 
legislation that governs the many.  Only by returning to republican principles 
can the Court fulfill the ideals of the Constitution. 
Moreover, Professor Sunstein’s synthesis of republican “commitments” 
suggests the Court erred when deciding Citizens United.347  First, Sunstein’s 
deliberation principle—yielding to collective decision-making by the 
legislature348—should create a strong deference to Congress’s campaign finance 
legislation.  When Congress passed BCRA, it did so with bipartisan support.349  
Congress collectively acted to prevent a threat to republican government.  
Moreover, the decision made was effectively an act of self-restraint; the Act 
limited the amount and sources of contributions members of Congress could 
receive in support of their own election or reelection.350  The Court should have 
deferred strongly to the Congressional findings that unrestricted money in 
politics subverted republican government.  Second, Sunstein’s political equality 
commitment—requiring equal access and opportunities to participate in 
government351—suggests the Court failed to uphold republican ideals in Citizens 
United.  At first glance, this commitment might seem to support the holding in 
Citizens United; by removing barriers to corporate contributions, the Court 
ensured that all members of society could participate in the political process.352  
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However, while the Court eliminated one barrier to political participation, it 
constructed a much more troublesome barrier for the average citizen.  
Corporations now have the ability to use their acquired wealth to influence 
elections in ways the average citizen cannot.  While wealthy individuals can 
spend on par with corporations, the average citizen cannot.  Corporations are 
unique in that they acquire money at a much greater rate and quantity than 
citizens, and thus have more expendable income to contribute to campaigns.353  
Citizens, though, do not have this ability.  The republican principle of political 
equality was subverted in Citizens United by giving an advantage to corporations 
that choose to influence the political process. 
The Court had an opportunity to revisit its decision in American Tradition 
Partnership v. Bullock.354  While the Court summarily reversed the decision by 
the Montana Supreme Court—thus reaffirming Citizens United355—it is useful 
to imagine how republicanism would have applied at the state level.  In 1912, 
the Montana legislature passed a law that forbade corporations from “mak[ing] 
a contribution or an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political 
committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party,”356 and 
prevented “a person, candidate, or political committee [from] accept[ing] or 
receiv[ing] a corporate contribution.”357  Corporations were permitted to make 
contributions and expenditures to a segregated fund comprised solely of 
voluntary donations.358  Western Tradition Partnership (“WTP,” subsequently 
named American Tradition Partnership) was a Colorado corporation that did 
business in Montana. 359   Oddly—and rather suspiciously—WTP refused to 
provide any information about the business in which it engaged.360  The State 
presented undisputed evidence that “WTP . . . act[s] as a conduit of funds for 
persons and entities including corporations who want to spend money 
anonymously to influence Montana elections.”361  The court found that WTP 
made unlimited expenditures from raised funds to influence Montana elections 
allegedly in violation of a Montana statute.362  However, WTP argued that the 
Montana statute violated its First Amendment rights and asked the court to apply 
Citizens United to find the statute unconstitutional.363  The district court applied 
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Citizens United to the case at hand and granted the injunction.364  The Montana 
Supreme Court, however, rejected WTP’s claim and upheld the statute.365 
Montana’s highest court held that the facts and law at issue in Citizens United 
varied enough to allow a different application in Montana.366  Unlike in Citizens 
United, Montana law allows for the establishment of a PAC “by filing simple 
and straight-forward forms or reports.”367  Moreover, the court looked at the 
numerous examples of corruption in Montana elections that led to the statute’s 
enactment as evidence of a compelling state interest in preventing unregulated 
corporate influence in elections.368  The district court held that “[e]xamples of 
well-financed corruption abound.”369  It turned to a well-documented political 
battle that was riddled with corruption.  In 1900, a West Virginian politician 
testified before the U.S. Senate that “‘[m]any people have become so indifferent 
to voting’ in Montana as a result of the ‘large sums of money that have been 
expended in the state.’”370  The early experiences with corruption led to populist 
reforms in the early twentieth century.371 
However, these reforms did not successfully dispel negative corporate 
influence in Montana. 372   At trial, the State presented two affidavits 
demonstrating the ongoing corruption by corporations. 373   Both men were 
former public servants in Montana and “affirmed that allowing unlimited 
independent expenditures of corporate money into the Montana political process 
would drastically change campaigning by shifting the emphasis to raising 
funds.”374  In addition to two former elected representatives, the State also used 
the testimony of Edwin Bender of the National Institute of Money in State 
Politics.375  He testified: 
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[S]tudies of election spending in the United States show that the 
percentage of campaign contributions from individual voters drops 
sharply from 48% in states with restrictions on corporate spending to 
23% in states without. Evidence presented in the District Court 
showed that in recent years in Montana, corporate independent 
spending on ballot issues has far exceeded spending from other 
sources.376 
The court held that the history of Montana created a compelling state interest in 
passing the campaign finance law in 1912. 377   The court further held that 
circumstances have not changed in Montana to minimize the usefulness of the 
law.378  It then concluded that by “applying the principles enunciated in Citizens 
United, it is clear that Montana has a compelling interest in imposing the 
challenged, rationally-tailored statutory restrictions.”379 
Following this decision, the plaintiffs sought a stay of the Montana Supreme 
Court, which the United States Supreme Court granted, thereby reinstating the 
lower court’s determination that the statute was unconstitutional.380  In June 
2012, the Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision 
without oral argument.381  The per curiam decision was brief, and simply stated: 
The question presented in this case is whether the holding of Citizens 
United applies to the Montana state law.  There can be no serious 
doubt that it does.  Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment 
below either were already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to 
meaningfully distinguish that case.382 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg, 
dissented.383  They expressed not only disapproval of the Court’s decision to 
reverse the Montana Supreme Court, but also with the Court’s decision in 
Citizens United.384 
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American Tradition Partnership presented an opportunity for the Court to 
apply republicanism to state campaign finance laws.  Unfortunately, the Court 
refused to do so.  Had it reconsidered its decision in Citizens United, 
republicanism could have played a central role in the Court’s opinion.  State 
campaign finance laws are more likely to benefit from republicanism than 
federal legislation.  A court’s inquiry into the history of corruption is easier at 
the state level because (1) most states have a shorter history than the federal 
government, and (2) corruption is easier to identify with a smaller pool of 
voters.385  Had the Supreme Court reviewed Montana’s decision, this fact would 
have been clear.  First, the fear of corruption in Montana is analogous to the fears 
of the Framers in eighteenth century America.  Just as the legislature had unjust 
influence in colonial America that led to corruption and widespread distrust in 
government, so too is Montana’s history full of corruption.386  Cass Sunstein’s 
deliberation commitment also tilts the scale in favor of upholding Montana’s 
law.  After experiencing decades of corruption, the Montana legislature acted 
collectively to minimize corrupting influences in the future.  Moreover, with a 
sharp decline in individual contributions and expenditures when campaign 
finance laws are absent,387 political equality bolsters support for Montana’s law.  
When voters are dissuaded from participating in the political process because 
non-voters—corporations—are permitted to expend unlimited amounts of 
money during elections, the Court must side in favor of the voters.  
Republicanism demands nothing less, and the Court should have upheld the 
Montana law to protect voters, the political process, and Montana’s republican 
form of government. 
B.  The Limits of Republicanism: How Statutes Can Over-Protect Against 
Corruption 
Critics of this Article might argue that republicanism gives Congress and state 
legislatures a blank check to regulate public participation in the electoral 
process.  However, a recent decision in Arizona demonstrates this is not true. 
In Galassini v. Town of Fountain Hills, a Federal Court enjoined the 
enforcement of an Arizona campaign finance law that regulated the ability of 
private citizens to protest political decisions made by a local government.388  
Dina Galassini, a citizen of Arizona, urged twenty-three friends to join her in 
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protesting a local bond issue.389  After emailing her friends, Ms. Galassini was 
notified by the town clerk of the need to comply with the Arizona law that 
required groups protesting any political issue to register and disclose as a 
political committee, even if they intended to raise and spend less than $500.390  
The Institute of Justice filed suit on her behalf, claiming the law violated her 
First Amendment rights.391  While the District Court granted the stay on First 
Amendment grounds, 392  future challenges of the law should ground their 
analysis in republicanism rather than the First Amendment.  Limits such as these 
on individuals are unlikely to survive republicanism challenges, as the 
government will find it very difficult to show why twenty-three peaceful citizens 
protesting a local government issue are likely to cause corruption.  Moreover, 
protests by citizens have deep seeded historical roots, most notably during the 
American Revolution.393  By theoretically attempting to protect the integrity of 
the political system, Arizona overstepped its authority by requiring the political 
registration of citizen groups merely trying to peacefully protest a simple 
political issue and planning to spend less than $500.  If republicanism is applied 
in this and similar cases, the courts should strike down laws creating undue 
burdens for citizens who seek to protest government policies. 
V.  REPUBLICANISM ABOVE ALL: WHY COMPETING MODELS FALL SHORT 
Three foundational law review articles suggest viewing campaign finance 
through a lens other than the First Amendment.  First, in 2003, Professor Mark 
C. Alexander suggested the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution empowers 
Congress to enact expansive campaign finance laws. 394   Next, Professor 
Teachout’s 2009 The Anti-Corruption Principle similarly offered a new vision 
of assessing campaign finance reform laws.395  Finally, in 2012, Professor Mark 
Rosen came the closest to fully capturing republicanism as a mode of 
constitutional analysis.  In The Structural Constitutional Principle of Republican 
Legitimacy, he too argues that republicanism is an important concept the Court 
has failed to apply.396  These articles, while novel in substance and ambitious in 
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intent, fail to fully grasp early American history and its impact on modern 
lawmaking, while narrowly suggesting revisions of current doctrines of the 
Supreme Court.  This section suggests that the underlying constitutional 
principle of republicanism is more practical, more faithful to the history of the 
American founding, and that its implications extend far beyond the realm of 
campaign finance law. 
In his article, Professor Alexander accurately traces the growth of 
republicanism following the revolution.397  He, too, believes a republican form 
of government mandates government action to prevent corruption.398  But where 
Professor Alexander and this author disagree is over how republicanism should 
be advanced.  He argues that Congress should enact legislation under the 
Guarantee Clause empowering the states to enact campaign finance 
restrictions.399  Alexander believes that this would survive a Buckley challenge 
in federal courts.400  While written before Citizens United and other campaign 
finance cases, Alexander’s argument is self-admittedly weak.  He demonstrated 
in his article how the Guarantee Clause is “[a] [c]losed [d]oor,”401 “has rested in 
relative obscurity for nearly two centuries,”402 and “has been lost in a judicial 
vacuum.” 403   Those are hardly encouraging words regarding a clause he 
encourages the Supreme Court to “revive.”404  Moreover, he runs into a problem 
with Congressional authority to enact such legislation; the Guarantee Clause is 
not enumerated with Congress’s other legislative power in Article I.405 
Finally, why do the states need to have Congressional approval to enact such 
measures?  If states are laboratories of democracy, nothing should prevent state 
legislators from passing—and state courts from subsequently upholding—
expansive campaign finance reform laws.  In fact, the Supreme Court of 
Montana recently held that Montana could limit corporate expenditures to 
further a candidate for political office.406  Even if Congress could legislate under 
the Guarantee Clause, the states would still need to prophylactically enact their 
own campaign finance laws.  Alexander’s approach—encouraging Congress to 
                                                        
 397. Alexander, supra note 18, at 774‒77 (emphasizing the framers’ intention to place the 
majority of political power with the people).  Again, this history is only fully understood when 
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 398. Id. at 835. 
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 400. Id. at 822‒23. 
 401. Id. at 784. 
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 404. Id. at 839. 
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CONST. art I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers with Congress). 
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act to allow states to enact campaign finance restrictions407—only tangentially 
solves the problem of Citizens United, if solving it at all.  Encouraging the Court 
to simply invoke the underlying constitutional principle of republicanism is a 
superior method of changing the current landscape for two reasons: first, for the 
reasons discussed in Part III, it is more likely to be used by the Court as a 
powerful tool for analysis; and second, it removes a substantial step in the 
process of change.  States can act immediately to respond to Citizens United.  
This process is already occurring, as evidenced by the recent Montana Supreme 
Court decision.  While the Supreme Court subsequently overturned that 
decision,408 states maintain the ability and authority to experiment with solutions 
to campaign finance issues. 
Professor Teachout similarly treats early American history with great detail 
and precision.409  She argues that the Constitution embodies an “anti-corruption” 
principle, which should influence the way in which the courts analyze campaign 
finance laws.410  There is no doubt that this principle is present throughout the 
Constitution,411 but where Professor Teachout and this author disagree is how 
this principle is reflected in the Constitution.  Professor Teachout details every 
provision in the Constitution that she believes embodies this anti-corruption 
principle.412  Such provisions include the election of government officials by 
“the people,”413 whether directly or indirectly, the checks and balances between 
the President and Congress through the appointment process, 414  and the 
Executive impeachment process.415  While these provisions do embody anti-
corruption principles, their primary function is to establish a republican form of 
government. 
While this distinction might seem minimal, the implications of encouraging 
the Court to use “anti-corruption” rather than “republicanism” are great.  
Republicanism and anti-corruption both force a reevaluation of decisions 
implicating campaign finance laws.  Republicanism, however, may reach far 
beyond the realm of campaign finance.  It also permeates a number of well-
established bodies of law, including lobbying activity, state judicial elections 
and recusal requirements, among others.416  The far reaching effects of this tool 
might be cause for hesitation by the Court.  However, if the goal of using 
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American history is to fully understand the Framers’ intent, then this tool’s 
implications should be fully explored and applied to the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Moreover, as described in Part III, underlying constitutional principles have 
well-established precedent in the Court.  Republicanism fits seamlessly into the 
prior legal framework established, and is thus more likely to be accepted by the 
Court.  Finally, the Court has already addressed—and to some extent, rejected—
corruption as an interpretive tool.417  This fact—tragic as it may be—suggests 
that in order to persuade the Court to reevaluate its decision in Citizens United 
and subsequent cases, litigants must raise new claims.  Republicanism should be 
one of those new claims. 
Most recently, Professor Rosen suggests that republicanism is a structural 
element of the Constitution and requires serious attention by the Court. 418  
Before deconstructing his argument, it is important to note that Professor Rosen 
and this author agree on nearly all fronts; the minimal disagreement, though, is 
substantial.  First, Rosen, like Alexander and Teachout, fails to fully explore 
republicanism’s development in American history.  This point cannot be 
overstated; the Court now more than ever searches for historical support for its 
decisions.419  Second, Rosen suggests that republicanism gives credence to the 
compelling state interest in enacting campaign finance legislation. 420   His 
suggestion, while perhaps an accurate description of how republicanism would 
work within the current debate infrastructure, fails to accurately capture what 
republicanism entails.  Rosen’s model for invocation merely suggests that 
republicanism should be a tangential feature of the Court’s analysis; it does not 
stand alone as a constitutional doctrine that the Court can invoke.  It merely 
justifies a compelling state interest.  He sells republicanism short by implying 
that it does not itself justify upholding or invalidating a law.  Additionally, Rosen 
is correct to place republicanism on the same plane as anti-commandeering and 
federalism, 421  but he fails to accurately identify how those underlying 
constitutional principles were accepted into the Court’s canon of interpretive 
tools.  In New York, Justice O’Connor did not argue that anti-commandeering 
created a compelling state interest, but rather introduced it as a way to steer the 
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Commerce Clause back to its proper role.422  Had Rosen examined the rise of 
federalism that led to limiting the Commerce Clause in Lopez, as this Article 
does in Part II, he would have recognized that underlying constitutional 
principles are independent doctrines the Court can invoke when necessary. 
Finally, Rosen fails to articulate the limits of republicanism.  In the realm of 
campaign finance, this failure becomes a fatal flaw in his model.  Rosen and this 
author agree that Citizens United would have been decided differently had the 
court employed republicanism as its analytical tool, but he is unclear on how it 
would apply in future campaign finance cases.  It is obvious that his model of 
republicanism will support liberal efforts to protect the political process from 
the corrupting influences of corporate money, but it is unclear how 
republicanism might also invalidate campaign finance laws.  Republicanism, as 
presented in this Article, easily solves this problem, as demonstrated by the 
discussion of republicanism and Galassini in Part IV.B.  Nevertheless, Rosen’s 
article still advances the effort to bring republicanism front and center in the 
Supreme Court. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has heretofore refused to accurately identify and apply 
the underlying constitutional principle of republicanism, which was created by 
the Constitution to avoid the government corruption the colonies witnessed 
occurring in Britain.  The Court has missed multiple opportunities to rediscover 
republicanism in order to properly balance the need to avoid corruption and the 
right to engage in political speech.  With Citizens United and McCutcheon, the 
Court clearly signaled that the old arguments to uphold campaign finance 
restrictions hold little, if any, weight before the Court today.  The next 
opportunity to subvert the misguided judicial philosophy by the Court is 
unknown.  In fact, just five days after McCutcheon was handed down, the Court 
both vacated a judgment denying a challenge to the aggregate limits,423 citing 
McCutcheon, and denied cert in a case challenging an Iowa law regulating 
contributions from corporations but permitting them from unions.424  While 
more challenges will inevitably come in the wake of McCutcheon, there has not 
yet been a clear opportunity for the Court to invoke republicanism in the 
campaign finance arena.  However, republicanism extends far beyond campaign 
finance. 
                                                        
 422. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180, 188 (1992).  Admittedly, it would have 
been odd to suggest that anti-commandeering created a compelling state interest because one is not 
needed for Congress to act under the Commerce Clause.  Nevertheless, Rosen recognizes the rise 
of anti-commandeering, yet makes an unexplained leap to suggest that his republicanism functions 
similarly by creating a compelling state interest.  Rosen, supra note 396, at 442. 
 423. James v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1806 (2014). 
 424. Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc., v. Tooker, 133 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
2015] House of Cards: Rediscovering Republicanism 705 
Republicanism is most evidently applicable to the realm of campaign finance 
reform, but extends to a number of different legal realms as well.  Lobbyists, 
some argue, pose as great a threat to independent legislatures as do corporate 
expenditures to campaigns.425  Not surprisingly, though, the Court has protected 
lobbying activity under the First Amendment with no consideration for its harm 
to the republic.426  Using republicanism as a tool for analysis would recalibrate 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to correctly reflect the harm some lobbying 
activity poses to the republic. 
If the Court adopts this tool for analysis, the presence of money in state 
judicial elections is also ripe for review.  In the British Empire, judges—like 
elected representatives in Parliament—were serving at the will of the Crown.427  
Decisions did not always reflect the result commanded by law.  Allowing 
campaign contributions to go to state judges potentially poses this same danger.  
Past scholarship has made this point, and the Supreme Court recognized it in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal.428  In Caperton, Justice Kennedy held that in 
some circumstances, elected judges should recuse themselves from decisions 
involving large donors to their past campaigns.429  Republicanism would affirm 
this decision, but may also require a full review of the constitutionality of 
campaign contributions in state judicial elections. 
Finally, this principle requires reexamination of the unlimited expenditures by 
private individuals to elect political candidates.  A wealthy individual expending 
money to elect a candidate poses as great a threat, if not a greater threat, to 
legislative independence as corporations.  While McCutcheon removed the 
aggregate limits on contributions, the Court has not yet opened the flood gates 
entirely.  When that case inevitably comes before the Court, republicanism 
stands ready and able to prevent the deluge of individual contributions. 
This Article introduces a new tool for analysis by the Supreme Court and 
focuses primarily on the controversial decision in Citizens United.  If taken 
seriously, this principle forces a serious reconsideration of age-old precedent.  
Future scholarship hopefully will embark on this ambitious endeavor. 
EPILOGUE 
The fate of Frank Underwood is still unknown.  Will his house of cards 
continue to grow?  Will he delay the inevitable crash?  His situation is best 
described as unknown.  In the political arena, unknowns are not admired.  
However, if choosing between Underwood’s unknown fate and the known 
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reality of campaign finance law, Underwood’s circumstances are far more 
appealing.  In the wake of McCutcheon, individual donors and corporations alike 
will have unprecedented opportunities to influence elections.  The Supreme 
Court has refused to embrace the political realities of the twenty-first century, 
and instead has chosen to construct a house of cards grounded in decades-old 
judicial philosophy.  It is unfortunate that the Court ended its historical 
exploration in the early twentieth century.  As this Article explains, had it 
reflected on the Founding, the Court would properly understand the role of 
republicanism in creating American democracy.  And it is only by rediscovering 
republicanism that the judicially constructed house of cards can be 
deconstructed. 
